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The Other Securities Regulator:
A Case Study in Regulatory Damage
Anita K. Krug*
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission is the primary securities regulator
in the United States, the Department of Labor also engages in securities regulation. It does so
by virtue of its authority to administer the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
the statute that governs the investment of retirement assets. In 2016, the DOL used its
securities regulatory authority to adopt a rule that, for the first time, designates securities
brokers who provide investment advice to retirement investors as fiduciaries subject to ERISA's
stringent transaction prohibitions. The new rule's objective is salutary, to be sure. However
this Article shows that, by way of its reformation of many advisers' relationships with their
retirement-investor customers, the 'fiduciary rule" imperils retirement investors in ways that
are not immediately evident and that other scholars have not noticed. First, the rule promotes
a particular investment strategy-namely, passive investing-for all retirement investors,
regardless of their individual needs or objectives. Second, as a thought experiment
demonstrates, the rule portends a constriction ofmost retirement investors'participation in the
securities markets and a still-wider gap, in terms of investment opportunities and performance,
between these investors and their "sophisticated" counterparts. Despite these dificulties and
speculation that the Trump administration would scuttle the rule, moreover the rule's effects
are likely enduring.
Given the damage that the fiduciary rule threatens to inflict on retirement investors, the
DOL's adoption of it is an episode of failed rulemaking-one that, as this Article contends,
may be traced to doctrinal factors: US. securities regulation is based on the notion that
regulation should be neutral as among firms' business and financial objectives and should
harness, without necessarily abolishing, financial professionals' conflicts of interest. Yet with
its fiduciary rule, the DOL has effectively forsaken the principle of neutrality and deployed a
scorched earth strategy against conflicts. With a view toward addressing the special concerns
that shared regulatory authority creates, the Article delves into the lessons arising fivm this
episode and how policymakers might better promote regulatory objectives and sound policy
going forward.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Securities regulation is a controversial subject. For example,
investor advocates contend that today's U.S. securities regulatory
apparatus contains too many exemptions and loopholes and is too
lenient in enforcing anti-fraud requirements. Meanwhile, financial
firms and their constituents counter that regulatory strictures are
already too burdensome and that, in any event, enforcement initiatives
are adequate to punish and deter wrongdoers. Despite disagreements
on these topics and many others, however, most observers agree that
the objectives of securities regulation are to protect investors, foster
confidence in the U.S. securities markets, and promote the growth of
investment in business enterprises and nonprofits.1 There is also
broad consensus that the regulatory agency charged with advancing
these objectives is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Yet a second regulator has increasingly made its mark on the
U.S. securities realm, fundamentally shaping how the securities
markets operate. This other regulator is the Department of Labor
(DOL). The DOL engages in securities regulation by virtue of its
authority to administer the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA),2 whose purpose is to protect retirement investors-meaning
employee benefit plan participants and owners of individual
retirement accounts (IRAs)-from harm at the hands of those who
have control over these investors' assets or otherwise are in a position
1. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Mad Money: Rethinking Private Placements, 71 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 2253, 2263 (2014) ("Commentators generally agree that securities laws ...
should facilitate capital formation and protect investors.").
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (2012).
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to benefit themselves to the investors' detriment.3 Moreover, the
Department's role as a securities regulator is significant, given that
U.S. retirement assets presently total nearly $25 trillion and account
for 36% of U.S. household financial assets.4
ERISA furthers its objectives in part through designating as a
fiduciary any financial professional who provides investment advice
to retirement investors about investment products and portfolio
allocation5 By imposing on these advisers a stringent standard of
conduct and prohibiting them from entering into certain types of
transactions, the statute establishes the general framework for
fiduciaries' obligations to retirement investors.6 However, it leaves
certain specifics to the DOL, including what constitutes the type of
advice that causes an adviser to be an ERISA fiduciary,7 and gives the
Department authority to adopt exemptions from its (that is, ERISA's)
prohibited transaction provisions.8 Over the years, the DOL has used
its power under ERISA to adopt scores of rules and prohibited
transaction exemptions.9 Until last year, although this output had
substantially changed how advisers who were ERISA fiduciaries-
primarily only those advisers who were also registered and regulated
as investment advisers under the securities laws-provided services to
retirement investors, it did not alter these advisers' business models or
the general nature of their services.
The DOL's longstanding accommodation of most advisory
activities changed in 2016, when the agency adopted a rule that has all
but upended the financial advisory industry. The rule-actually, a
suite of associated rules-designates as ERISA fiduciaries a large
3. See History ofEBSA and ERISA, U.S. DEP'T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa (last visited Aug. 28, 2017) (noting that
one of ERISA's goals is "to protect the interests of participants ... in employee benefit
plans").
4. See Nick Thornton, Total Retirement Assets Near $25 Trillion Mark,
BENEFITsPRO (June 30, 2015), http://www.benefitspro.com/2015/06/30/total-retirement-
assets-near-25-trillion-mark.
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) ("[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to
the extent . . . he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation ... with respect
to any moneys or other property of such plan. . .
6. See id. § § 1104, 1106.
7. See id. § 1135 (granting the DOL authority to adopt rules "to carry out the
provisions" of ERISA, including to "define accounting, technical and trade terms used in
such provisions").
8. See id. § 1108(a).
9. See Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (setting forth the DOL's rules pertaining to "fiduciary
responsibility" under ERISA).
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swath of financial professionals who previously did not qualify as
such.10 These professionals are advisers employed by securities
brokerage firms who provide sporadic investment recommendations
to their customers, many of whom are retirement investors, but who
are primarily securities brokers whose advisory activities are not so
extensive as to cause them to be deemed investment advisers under
the securities laws."
Although the objective of the "fiduciary rule"--to give
retirement investors stronger fiduciary protections-is salutary, the
rule is among the most controversial ever adopted by a federal
regulatory agency. After the DOL proposed the rule in April 2015,
interested parties submitted thousands of comment letters expressing
their strong opposition or support for the proposal,12 while other
observers imparted their views in editorials and blog posts. 13 This
attention intensified upon the rule's adoption, as numerous financial
and insurance firms filed lawsuits claiming, among other things, that
the DOL lacked authority to adopt the rule and that Congress had
expressly disagreed with many of the rule's proscriptions.1 4 To the
extent that, by late 2016, the clatter had begun to wane, Donald
10. See Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509,
2510, 2550).
11. See Michelle Singletary, Is Your Adviser Truly Protecting Your Retirement?,
WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/get-there/is-your-
adviser-truly-protecting-your-retirement/2015/09/10/9a66a2fe-564d-11 e5-8bbl-b488d231bb
a2_story.html (discussing the purpose of the rule).
12. See Public Comments, Conflict of Interest Proposed Rule, U.S. DEP'T LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-
comments/1210-AB32-2 (last visited Aug. 29, 2017); Public Comments, Conflict ofInterest
Exemptions-Proposals, U.S. DFP'T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-
regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-ZA25 (last visited Aug. 29,2017).
13. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, More Protection for a Nest Egg Has Some Brokers
Upset, N.Y. TIMEs: YouR MONEY (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/
your-money/more-protection-for-a-nest-egg-has-some-brokers-upset.html (quoting opponents
and proponents of the then-proposed fiduciary rule); Daisy Maxey, Battle Continues Over
Fiduciary Rule for Retirement Investments, WALL ST. J.: MKTS. (June 14, 2015, 11:13 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/battle-continues-over-fiduciary-rule-for-retirement-investments-
1434054916 (same); Meghan Milloy, DOL's Proposed Fiduciary Rule: Not in the Best
Interest of Investors, Am. ACTION F. (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.americanactionforum.org/
research/dols-proposed-fiduciary-rule-not-in-the-best-interest-of-investors/ (contending that
the then-proposed fiduciary rule would harm investors).
14. See, e.g., Complaint, Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Perez, No. 16-cv-03289 (D.
Minn. Sept. 29, 2016); Complaint, Mkt. Synergy Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, No. 5-16-
cv-04083 (D. Kan. June 8, 2016); Complaint, Nat'l Ass'n for Fixed Annuities v. Perez, No.
1:16-cv-01035 (D.D.C. June 2, 2016); Complaint, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v.
Perez, No. 16-cv-01476 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 2016) [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce
Complaint].
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Trump's election as president resurrected it, raising the prospect that
his administration would undermine the rule, either by repealing it,
refusing to defend it against the pending lawsuits, or foregoing
enforcement of it. 15 Yet the lawsuits have generally failed at the
summary judgment stage, 16 and it now appears that, despite an
executive order directing the DOL to reevaluate the rulel7 and a delay
of its compliance date,18 the new administration will likely not subvert
15. See Warren S. Hersch, DOL Rule Faces Certain Death Under President-Elect
Trump, THINKADVISOR (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/11/09/dol-rule-
faces-certain-death-under-president-elect ("[T]he DOL's widely criticized conflict-of-interest
regulations will not survive a united wall of opposition from Congress, the courts or the
Republican administration of President Donald J. Trump.").
16. See, e.g., Mark Schoeff Jr., Dallas Judge Upholds DOL Fiduciary Rule,
INVESTMENTNEWS: FIDUCIARY Focus (Feb. 8, 2017, 5:11 PM), http://www.investmentnews.
com/article/20170208/FREE/170209907/dallas-judge-upholds-dol-fiduciary-rule (reporting
that the district court for the Northern District of Texas, in granting summary judgment to the
DOL, "shot down each of the major arguments submitted by industry trade groups"); Mark
Schoeff Jr., Kansas Judge Again Upholds DOL Fiduciary Rule, INVESTMENTNEWS:
FIDuctIARY Focus (Feb. 17, 2017, 6:46 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/2017
0217/FREE/170219896/kansas-judge-again-upholds-dol-fiduciary-rule ("A Kansas federal
judge upheld the Labor Department fiduciary rule on Friday, giving the measure its fourth
court victory since November."); Trial Court Rejects DOL Fiduciary Rule Challenge,
THOMSON REUTERS: TAX & ACCOUNTING (Dec. 1, 2016), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/
checkpoint-ebia-newsletter/trial-court-rejects-dol-fiduciary-rule-challenge/ (reporting that two
courts had denied litigants' requests for preliminary injunctions).
17. See President Donald J. Trump, Fiduciary Duty Rule: Memorandum for the
Secretary of Labor, 82 Fed. Reg. 9675 (Feb. 7, 2017) (directing the DOL to "examine the
Fiduciary Duty Rule to determine whether it may adversely affect the ability of Americans to
gain access to retirement information and financial advice").
18. On February 9, 2017, the DOL proposed to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) that the rule's compliance date be delayed by 180 days, subject to a comment
period. See Sarah N. Lynch, Exclusive: Labor Department To Delay, Revisit Fiduciary
Rule-Sources, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2017, 6:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
brokerage-regulation-exclusive/exclusive-labor-department-to-delay-revisit-fiduciary-rule-
sources-idUSKBN15PO07; Jacklyn Wille, Trump and the Fiduciary Rule: The Uncertainty of
What's Ahead, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/trump-fiduciary-
rule-n57982083674/. With the OMB's approval, the DOL ultimately postponed the rule's
original April 10, 2017, compliance date by sixty days, establishing June 9, 2017, as the new
compliance date. See Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-
Retirement Investment Advice; Best Interest Contract Exemption (Prohibited Transaction
Exemption 2016-01); Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets Between
Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs (Prohibited
Transaction Exemption 2016-02); Prohibited Transaction Exemptions 75-1, 77-4, 80-83, 83-
1, 84-24 and 86-128, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,902 (Apr. 7, 2017) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
2510). In addition, the DOL postponed implementation of certain components of the rule
from January 1, 2018, to July 1, 2019. Mark Schoeff Jr., DOL Fiduciary Rule: Agency Says
It Will Come Up with New Ways To Comply During Delay Period, INVESTMENTNEWS:
FIDUCIARY Focus (Aug. 30, 2017, 2:30 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/2017
0830/FREE/170839993/dol-fiduciary-rule-agency-says-it-will-come-up-with-new-ways-to.
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the rule's trajectory.19 Moreover, even if the judicial process or the
administration were to ultimately scuttle the rule, that action would
likely not undo the rule's impact.20
The core of that impact is the fact that ERISA deems it a conflict
of interest for a fiduciary to be compensated for her services on a per
transaction basis and therefore prohibits such compensation.21 Yet
transaction-based compensation defines how securities brokers do
business. After all, brokers receive commissions for executing
securities trades.22 In selling securities from their own inventories in
their capacities as securities dealers, they receive markups-
19. See Michael Kitces, DoL Fiduciary Not Yet Delayed By President Trump After
All. . ., NERD'S EYE ViEw (Feb. 4, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.kitces.com/blog/president-
trump-executive-order-memorandum-no-fiduciary-rule-delay/ (describing the challenges
associated with revising or rescinding the rule or delaying its applicability date and noting
that "[a]t a minimum ... it's looking increasingly likely that the DoL fiduciary rule will be
here to stay in some form"); Wille, supra note 18 (citing experts who believe that despite
ongoing controversy, the fiduciary rule "may be here to stay").
20. It is expected that even after a repeal of the rule, securities brokers would
maintain the business practices they implemented in order to comply with the rule. See Zeke
Faux, Trump's Fiduciary Rule Order Seen Unlikely To Stop Fee Shift, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3,
2017, 7:20 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-03/trump-s-fiduciary-
rule-order-seen-unlikely-to-stop-fee-shift (reporting that President Trump's initiatives to
repeal the "fiduciary rule" are "unlikely to derail the ... changes already under way in
response" to the rule); Melanie Waddell, Trump To Direct DOL To Delay Fiduciary Rule:
Sources, THINKADVISOR (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2017/01/31/trump-
to-direct-dol-to-delay-fiduciary-rule-source (noting that securities brokers have changed their
business models and compensation practices in order to comply with the rule and that "with
. . . or without" the rule, "commission-based business models are on their way out"); Michael
Wursthom, New Retirement Rule Is Delayed, but Not Its Impact, WALL ST. J.: MKTS. (Apr. 8,
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-retirement-rule-is-delayed-but-not-its-
impact-1491652800 (reporting that a repeal of the rule likely will not cause financial firms to
revert to pre-rule business practices and that various financial firms intend to "forg[e] ahead"
with implementing the fiduciary rule, notwithstanding uncertainty about its fate). In addition,
the intense popular discussion about the rule has likely permanently heightened regulatory
and customer scrutiny of securities brokers' conduct. See Jeff Benjamin, DOL Rule or Not,
Be Prepared To Defend Investments, Fees Under a Fiduciary Standard, INVESTMENTNEWS
(Feb. 1, 2017, 6:38 PM), www.investmentnews.com/article/2017020 1/FREE/170209983/
dol-rule-or-not-be-prepared-to-defend-investments-fees-under-a (observing that "[riegardless
of what happens, the cat's out of the bag now, because clients are more educated" and that
"[w]hether the full rule is implemented or delayed, it doesn't matter to the end user" (quoting
Joe Taiber, managing partner of an investment consulting firm)).
21. See Kristina M. Zanotti, Beyond the Soundbite: Why the New DOL Fiduciary
Rule Means More Than Acting in a Client's Best Interests, BENEFITS L.J., Summer 2016, at 7
(describing how transaction-based compensation constitutes a prohibited conflict of interest
under ERISA).
22. See Daisy Maxey, Ruling Near on Fiduciary Duty for Brokers, WALL ST. J.:
WEALTH MGMT. (Apr. 13, 2014, 4:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ruling-near-pn-
fiduciary-duty-for-brokers-1396894687 (noting that brokers often receive commissions as
compensation).
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compensatory amounts added to securities' market prices.23 And in
recommending and selling shares of mutual funds-the mainstay
investment for retirement savers-they often receive front-end sales
loads (paid by purchasing investors),24 so-called 12b-1 fees (paid by
the funds themselves),25 or revenue sharing payments (typically paid
by the funds' managers).26
To be sure, transaction-based compensation structures could
incentivize a broker to recommend and execute more transactions on
behalf of a customer than what is in the customer's best interests or to
recommend investments as to which the commissions or other fees
are higher than those associated with other, possibly more suitable,
investments. 27 That is ERISA's worry, and it is well founded.
However, these compensation models also further the interests of
investors who trade infrequently (which describes most retirement
investors) because they render investment advice more affordable than
advice provided in exchange for the asset-based fees28 that registered
investment advisers typically receive, which the DOL generally deems
acceptable.29 This is a critical point, moreover, because investors who
23. See Markup, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/markup.asp
(last visited Sept. 1, 2017) ("Markups occur when dealers act as principals, buying and
selling securities from their own accounts at their own risk, as opposed to brokers receiving a
fee for facilitating a transaction.").
24. See Front-End Load, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/front-
endload.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2017) (noting that "[a] front-end load is a commission or
sales charge" that is often applied in connection with an investor's purchase of mutual fund
shares).
25. See Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersmffeeshtm.html (last modified Jan. 15, 2013)
(noting that mutual funds pay 12b-1 fees to "compensat[e] brokers and others who sell fund
shares").
26. See Dan Jamieson, Broker-Dealers Derive Big Income from Revenue-Sharing
Deals, FIN. ADVISOR (May 11, 2015), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/broker-dealers-derive-
big-income-from-revenue-sharing-deals-21717.html ("Revenue-sharing fees are paid by all
types of product sponsors directly to [broker-dealers].").
27. See, e.g., Jason Van Bergen, Paying Your Investment Advisor-Fees or
Commissions?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/04/022704.asp
(last visited Sept. 1, 2017) ("[T]o increase their commissions, some brokers practice
churning, the unethical practice of excessively buying and selling securities in a client's
account.").
28. An asset-based fee is one that is paid periodically (usually monthly or quarterly)
and that equals a designated percentage of the assets as to which the customer receives
advice. Definition ofAsset-Based Fee, PALADIN RES. & REGISTRY, https://www.paladinregistry.
com/fmancial-dictionary/asset-based-fee?letter-A (last visited Aug. 31, 2017) (defining an
asset-based fee as "[a] fee that is charged by financial advisors that is a percentage of their
client's assets").
29. See Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002, 21,011 n.18 (Apr. 8,
2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (opining that an adviser's "ongoing receipt of
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rely on investment advice from financial professionals tend to save
more and realize better investment performance than those who do
not procure such advice.30
Nevertheless, as this Article contends, this tension-between, on
the one hand, eliminating conflicts of interest that might harm
retirement investors and, on the other, forcing them to pay more for
investment advice-does not end in a draw. Rather, by way of its
reformation of many advisers' (securities brokers') relationships with
their retirement-investor customers, the fiduciary rule imperils
investors in ways that are not immediately evident and, indeed, that
other scholars and observers have not noticed.31 These subtle but
significant effects stem from the fact that the rule encourages a
particular approach to investing or, in industry parlance, a particular
investment strategy. That is, by making broker-supplied advice more
expensive, it incentivizes advisers to recommend low-cost, passively
managed products such as exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and index
funds-products that aim to achieve returns that mirror the returns of
particular markets or indices and therefore do not rely on their
managers' ability to actively select high-performing portfolio
positions.32
This response makes sense under the logic that, if the advice that
brokers provide becomes more expensive as a result of these advisers'
adoption of asset-based or other types of compensation models, then
costs that investors bear elsewhere in the investment chain should be
lowered to make up the difference. However, it harms retirement
investors. For one thing, despite the benefit of passively managed
investment strategies, actively managed strategies remain critical for
achieving optimal returns and portfolio diversification. 33 More
compensation based on a fixed percentage of the value of assets under management does not
require a prohibited transaction exemption").
30. See Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 14, at 3.
31. Indeed, no other scholar has evaluated the fiduciary rule beyond reporting
concerns previously raised by the rule's critics, despite the tremendous controversy that the
rule has generated throughout the financial industry and beyond. See, e.g., Harvey Bines &
Steve Thel, The Varieties of Investment Management Law, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
71, 108-11 (2016) (summarizing various aspects of the rule); Roberta S. Karmel, The
Challenge of Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment Advisers Act After Seventy-Five Years,
10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 405, 423-25 (2016) (noting the rule and summarizing
some of the criticisms against it); Paul M. Secunda, The Behavioral Economic Case for
Paternalistic Workplace Retirement Plans, 91 IND. L.J. 505, 543 (2016) (briefly referring to
the rule in a broader discussion about the Australian pension scheme).
32. See infra notes 122-124, 128-133 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
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important, through setting in motion a push toward passive
management, the rule portends an investment universe in which there
is no need for retirement investors to choose among investment
options-for there is only the one option. In this universe, there is
also no need for individually tailored investment advice, and the
notion that advisers have fiduciary obligations no longer has meaning.
The rule also portends, therefore, a constriction of most retirement
investors' participation in the securities markets and a still-wider gap,
in terms of investment opportunities and performance, between
retirement investors and their sophisticated counterparts, who
generally do not rely on broker-supplied advice.34
Given the damage that the fiduciary rule threatens to inflict on
retirement investors, the DOL's adoption of it is an episode of failed
rulemaking-one that, this Article contends, may be traced to
doctrinal factors. First, the rule is inconsistent with securities
regulation's foundational principle. In enacting the securities laws in
the Great Depression's aftermath, Congress rejected an approach that
would require regulators to pass judgment on the substance, or merits,
of any particular endeavor.35 It did so, among other reasons, because
it reasonably discerned that such an approach could hinder efficient
capital allocation, harming both investors and the capital formation
process. 36 Instead, it adopted a regulatory regime in which regulatory
subjects need only comply with specified procedural requirements-
disclosure requirements, in particular-and to always be truthful in
doing so. 37 Congress thus embraced regulatory neutrality as its
foundational principle and adopted transparency as its pivotal
regulatory tool.
In contrast, with the fiduciary rule, the DOL implicitly passes
judgment on both the worth of actively-and passively-managed
strategies and the nature and scope of retirement investors'
participation in the securities markets. It therefore furthers a vision of
34. See infra notes 145-146, 151-156 and accompanying text.
35. See Arthur B. Laby, Models of Securities Regulation in the United States, 23
FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. S20 n.2 (2000) (observing that Congress considered but ultimately
rejected "[m]erit based regulation of public companies .. . in favor of disclosure").
36. See Rutheford B Campbell Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky
Regulation, 10 J. CoRP. L. 553, 565 (1985) ("[Mlerit regulation unnecessarily constrains the
freedom of people to do business as they see fit, discourages entrepreneurial initiative and
impedes the flow of capital to its most efficient use.").
37. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) ("The design of the
[Securities Act] is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought
necessary to informed investment decisions.").
2017] 347
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securities regulation that is at odds with Congress's emphasis on
neutrality and effectively drops a foreign organism into a generally
self-contained and self-referencing system. The rule harms investors
because that system cannot accommodate it and, further, lacks the
means to counter its effects in other ways.
Second, the rule ignores securities regulation's core challenge,
which this Article identifies as controlling, without necessarily
eliminating, conflicts of interest-that is, the incentives of issuers,
financial professionals, and others with information advantages to
further their own interests at the expense of investors' interests. This
concern, which reflects a recognition that regulation should not so
heavily dictate procedure that these market participants can no longer
pursue activities that contribute to economic and capital growth, led
Congress to adopt regulatory approaches that balanced competing
interests: those who have information advantages may proceed with
conflict-causing (but market-benefiting) activities but with caveats
that impose limits or that mandate disclosure or other specific
protections.
Although the fiduciary rule is expressly based on the goal of
protecting investors from their advisers' conflicts of interest, the DOL
eschewed the pragmatic approach on which securities regulation has
relied for so long and instead opted to eliminate conflicts altogether.
Yet by cutting off a category of economically productive activity-the
broker-retirement investor advisory relationship and the per
transaction compensation on which it has historically relied-the rule
sends advisers looking for a "second best" business model that
ultimately cannot be found. Rather, in place of this relationship there
is a hastily constructed arrangement in which the financial costs
associated with any particular investment is the sole determinant of
whether the investment is good or bad or somewhere in between.
The dissonance characterizing the DOL's latest securities
regulatory initiative provides lessons beyond the securities regulatory
realm, however. It also demonstrates that shared regulatory authority
may fail due to a factor beyond the duplication, confusion, and
inefficiencies that shared authority has often created.38 It may fail,
that is, because it does not satisfy a structural precondition that the
scholarly literature on shared regulatory authority has not heretofore
38. See Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and
Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 237, 238-39 (2011) (describing common
criticisms of shared regulatory authority).
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recognized-namely, consonance in the two regulators' norms and
goals.39 This precondition does not exist in the case of the authority
that the DOL and the SEC share, and the fact that previous DOL
rulemaking under ERISA has not produced the harm that the present
case study highlights is arguably only a matter of happenstance.
Although the attitudinal divide separating regulators with shared
authority may seem less severe in other rulemaking to date, the
ongoing expansion of the regulatory state means that policymaking
vigilance is critical. Accordingly, as its coda, this Article offers
suggestions for avoiding similar circumstances in the future. 40
Moreover, to return to the concerns at hand, it also offers a better
approach for protecting retirement investors from their advisers'
conflicts of interest and avoiding harm either to them or to a securities
regulatory regime, that, while worthy of much criticism, has gotten
some things right.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Providing the foundation
for the Parts that follow, Part II describes the regulatory structure
governing employee benefit plans and IRAs and the DOL's role within
that structure. It additionally explains the heretofore important role
that securities brokers have played in advising retirement investors
and the contours of the DOL's new fiduciary rule. Part Il turns to the
ways in which the fiduciary rule redounds to investors' detriment,
showing how the rule implicitly promotes passive investing,
regardless of whether such an investment approach is optimal for
most investors or in all circumstances. This Part further deploys a
thought experiment to contend that, as a result of its impact on
portfolio allocation, the rule encourages advisers to opt out of
securities regulation and serves to exclude investors from greater
securities market participation. Focusing on the doctrinal bases of the
rule's impact, Part IV asserts that the regulatory approach and attitude
that spawned the rule is inconsistent not only with the foundational
principle of securities regulation, which is neutrality, but also its core
challenge, which is to mitigate conflicts of interest. It concludes,
however, that the difficulties surrounding the fiduciary rule provide
important lessons for policymakers as they produce additional
instances of shared regulatory authority and important lessons for the
DOL in its future regulation of the securities markets and its
participants.
39. See infra notes 194-203 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 205-209 and accompanying text.
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II. SECURITIES REGULATION BY ANOTHER NAME
It is axiomatic that Congress created different regulatory bodies
to serve different purposes. Accordingly, the function of the
Department of Labor, a cabinet-level department since 1913, is to
improve the well-being of workers and retirees, promote safe working
conditions, and ensure the availability of employment-related rights
and benefits.41 As part of this mission, the DOL is responsible for
administering ERISA, the federal statute that aims to protect
participants in employee benefit plans.42 Meanwhile, the function of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, as the agency charged with
implementing and enforcing the federal securities laws, is to regulate
the country's securities markets and stock exchanges, with a view
toward protecting investors, promoting market integrity and stability,
and fostering capital formation.43
And never the twain shall meet-or so one might imagine based
simply on the two agencies' strikingly different responsibilities and
objectives. However, there is overlap between the regulatory regimes
governing employee benefit plans, on the one hand, and the securities
markets, on the other. That is an inevitable product of the fact that
ERISA and the DOL's rules under ERISA govern certain securities
professionals' activities, insofar as the assets of employee benefit
plans (plan assets) or IRA accounts are involved.44 Moreover, the
DOL has rigorously exercised its securities regulatory authority, most
recently adopting a rule that has profound implications for both
securities investors and the securities markets more broadly.45 This
Part sets the stage for Part III's discussion of the new rule's impact.
Part I.A delves into ERISA-its structure and coverage, including
the obligations it imposes on those who are deemed fiduciaries-and
the DOL's role in administering it, while Part II.B discusses what the
new rule requires and how it promises to dramatically change how
41. See Judson MacLaury, A Brief History: The U.S. Department of Labor, U.S.
DEP'T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/dolhistoxford.htm (last visited
Aug. 30, 2017) (describing the DOL's history and functions).
42. See id ("[ERISA] gave the Department a major role in protecting and improving
the nation's private retirement systems.").
43. See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/
Article/whatwedo.html (last modified June 10, 2013) (describing the SEC's objectives and
functions).
44. EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMN., DEP'T OF LABOR, MEETING YouR FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITIES 1-4 (2012), http://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-
activities/resource-center/publications/meeting-your-fiduciary-responsibilities.pdf.
45. See Hersch, supra note 15.
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thousands of securities professionals operate vis-a-vis retirement
investors.
A. ERISA and the DOL's Rules
ERISA was Congress's response to a number of problems
stemming from how employers operated the employee benefit plans
that they sponsored. Most notably, many employers, in violation of
their contractual obligations, had failed to fund their plans, thereby
depriving participants of payments and benefits on which they had
relied to support them in their postemployment years.46 To address
these deficiencies, ERISA requires, among other things, that plans
provide a complaint and appeals process for participants claiming
plan benefits and allows plan participants to sue various parties based
on the latter's failure to perform their duties under the statute. 47
ERISA also subjects plan sponsors to extensive reporting and
disclosure requirements.48
However, it is the statute's fiduciary provisions that intersect with
securities regulation and that are increasingly inconsistent with it.
ERISA provides that a person is a fiduciary to an employee benefit
plan if she engages in at least one of three types of activities,
including "render[ing] investment advice for a fee or other
compensation ... with respect to any moneys or other property of
such plan."49 Although advisers who are registered with the SEC as
investment advisers and regulated as such under the securities laws
(registered investment advisers}-who exist solely to provide
investment advice to their clients-are ERISA fiduciaries under this
description, it has been less clear whether securities brokers similarly
are, given that the advice they provide is often sporadic and merely
incidental to their brokerage services.50
46. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/economics-
business-and-labor/businesses-and-occupations/employee-retirement (last visited Aug. 24,
2017) (describing the types of problems that necessitated ERISA).
47. See ERISA, U.S. DEP'T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/retirement/erisa
(last visited Aug. 28, 2017) (summarizing ERISA's content).
48. See id.
49. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012).
50. See LAURA PAGLIA, TORYS LLP, STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR ADVISORS AND
DEALERS: EXPLORING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF INTRODUCING A STATUTORY BEST INTEREST
DUTY WHEN ADVICE IS PROVIDED TO RETAIL CLIENTS 3 (2013), https://www.ific.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/CSA-Consultation-Paper-33-403-a-legal-analysis-by-Laura-Paglia-
Torys-November-11-2013.pdf/6255/ ("[T]he U.S. makes a distinction between 'broker-
dealers' who provide more incidental and sporadic advice and 'investment advisors' who
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Congress gave the DOL authority to resolve the ambiguity-the
question of what sort of investment advice gives rise to the type of
relationship that should render an adviser an ERISA fiduciary-by
granting the DOL the authority to define "accounting, technical and
trade terms" that the statute uses.51 Accordingly, in 1975 the DOL
adopted a rule setting forth five characteristics that must be present in
order for an adviser to be deemed to be providing investment advice
as used in ERISA's definition of fiduciary. Specifically, the adviser
must be (1) providing advice as to "the value of securities or other
property, or mak[ing] recommendation[s] as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property," (2) on
a regular basis and, (3) "pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement
or understanding" between the adviser and an employee benefit plan,
(4) "that such services will serve as a primary basis for investment
decisions with respect to" the plan's assets, and (5) that the adviser
"will render individualized investment advice to the plan based on the
particular needs of the plan."5 2
In its articulation of these five characteristics, the DOL
effectively defined investment advice in a manner that accords with
longstanding doctrine under the securities laws.53 In particular,
because the DOI's definition provides that advice is not investment
advice unless it is tailored to the needs of the relevant investor and
provided on a regular basis pursuant to a mutual agreement between
adviser and investor, it generally captures only those who are
registered investment advisers54-and who, under the securities laws,
are already fiduciaries to those they advise.55 By contrast, because the
provide ongoing advice on a portfolio basis, each in turn subject to different regulatory and
statutory regimes.").
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1135.
52. Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,954 n.15 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 80a.
54. Under the securities laws, an "investment adviser" is someone who "for
compensation, engages in the business of advising others ... as to the value of securities or as
to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation
and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning
securities." Id. § 80b-2(a)(1 1). Among an investment adviser's basic functions is
"furnishing to clients on a personal basis competent, unbiased, and continuous advice
regarding the sound management of their investments." SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 187 (1963).
55. See Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 191 (highlighting how
Congress deemed those who qualify as "investment advisers" to be fiduciaries to their
clients).
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definition does not encompass those who provide sporadic advice
regarding securities or other investment products or who have
disavowed any mutual understanding that their advice is based on the
relevant investor's needs,56 it generally does not capture those who are
securities brokers under the securities laws-and who, under those
laws, are not already fiduciaries to those they advise.57
That the 1975 definition generally does not encompass securities
brokers has been fortuitous for those professionals because of the
implications of being a fiduciary under ERISA. As an initial matter,
ERISA prohibits fiduciaries from engaging in three different types of
conflict of interest transactions in connection with advising an
employee benefit plan: dealing with the plan's assets in the fiduciary's
own interest or for her own account, acting on behalf of a party whose
interests are adverse to those of the plan or its participants or
beneficiaries in any transaction involving the plan, and receiving any
consideration for her own account from anyone dealing with the plan
in a transaction involving the plan's assets.58 Moreover, ERISA
contains a second set of prohibited transaction rules, which apply not
only to fiduciaries but also to service providers to an employee benefit
plan who do not qualify as fiduciaries, such as plan administrators
and accountants. 59
Taken together, these transaction prohibitions are substantially
broader than the prohibitions that the securities laws and rules impose
on advisers who are fiduciaries under the securities laws.60 They
prevent fiduciaries who provide investment advice to a plan or its
participants from advising the plan as to a wide range of investment
and trading activities-activities that are not prohibited under the
securities laws.61 For example, a securities fiduciary is able to cause
56. See Zanotti, supra note 21, at 5 (describing how financial professionals who did
not meet certain elements of the DOL's five-part test avoided being ERISA fiduciaries).
57. See Maxey, supra note 22 (noting that securities brokers are not fiduciaries).
58. See 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) ("Transactions between plan and fiduciary.").
59. See id. § 1106(a) ("Transactions between plan and party in interest."). These
"party-in-interest" prohibited transaction rules prohibit fiduciaries and other parties-in-
interest from, among other things, "caus[ing] the plan to engage a transaction" if the
transaction constitutes a sale or exchange of any property, the lending of money, or the
furnishing of "goods, services, or facilities" between the plan and a party-in-interest. Id.
60. See David C. Kaleda, What It Means To Be an ERISA Fiduciary: A Comparison
to the Securities Laws, NAT'L SOC'Y COMPLIANCE PROF. CURRENTS, May/June 2013, at 10-
13, http://www.groom.com/media/publication/1269_ERISA-Fiduciary-Comparison-to
SecuritiesLaws.pdf.
61. Cf David C. Kaleda, Do You Really Want to Do That? IRAs and the Prohibited
Transaction Provisions, INv. LAW., May 2012, at 4 (observing with regard to equivalent
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two accounts to enter into transactions in which one account sells a
security to the other (a cross trade) if the fiduciary complies with
certain procedures and believes the transaction to be in the best
interests of both accounts. 62 However, ERISA prohibits such
transactions (insofar as a plan assets account is involved) on the basis
that the fiduciary is representing a party (the other account) whose
interests are adverse to the plan's interests.6 3 In addition, although
causing a plan to sell securities shortM is not necessarily problematic
under the securities laws, ERISA prohibits such transactions because
the counterparty-that is, the institution lending the securities to be
sold short-is typically a party-in-interest as a result of other services
that it provides to the plan.65 Still, prior to the DOUs adoption of the
rule described below, these more stringent fiduciary requirements did
not substantially alter ERISA fiduciaries' business models or ability
to provide their services, largely because of how most fiduciaries
(again, mostly registered investment advisers) were compensated.66
Nevertheless, to address the circumstance that rules designed to
protect plan participants could actually counter participants' interests,
prohibitions in the Internal Revenue Code that "[t]he statute essentially starts with the
premise that most transactions" involving retirement assets are impermissible).
62. Les Abromovitz, Agency and Principal Transactions, THINKADVISOR (Jan. 1,
2012), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2012/0 1/01/agency-and-principal-transactions (observing
that under the securities laws, "there is no prohibition from engaging in principal and agency
[cross] transactions," but that, in effecting a cross trade, an investment adviser "must satisfy a
disclosure and client consent requirement").
63. See EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND, DOL IssuEs FINAL REGULATIONS UNDER ERISA
CROSS TRADE EXEMPTION 1 (Oct. 21, 2008), http://us.eversheds-sutherland.com/portal
resource/lookup/poid/ZltOl9NPluKPtDNIqLMRV56Pab6TfzcRXncKbDtRr9tObDdEtGpDt
0!/fileUpload.name=/EmpBenAlertDOLIssuesFinalRegslO2108.pdf ("DOL's view is that a
cross trade gives rise to [a] prohibited transaction ... inasmuch as the adviser or manager is
'representing' both sides of the transaction.").
64. A short sale involves selling a publicly traded security that the seller borrowed
from someone else (usually a financial institution) in hopes that the price of the security will
thereafter decrease. If it does so, then, when the seller buys the security in order to pay off
her loan, she will retain as profit the difference between the price at which she sold the
security and the price at which she later purchased it. See Matthew Lewis, Comment, A
Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of American and British Hedge Fund
Regulation, 22 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 347, 358 (2008) (describing the process of selling
securities short).
65. See ScHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, LLP, ERISA: FROM No PLAN ASSETS TO
MANAGING PLAN ASSETS 3, 5 (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.srz.com/images/content/l/3/v2/
139880/012115-SRZ-PIF-2016-ERISA.pdf (noting that "[1]oans and other extensions of
credit, including margin loans and short sales" are prohibited under ERISA).
66. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (noting that registered investment
advisers typically receive asset-based fees, rather than transaction-based fees).
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ERISA also contains a number of exemptions to its prohibitions.67 In
addition, the DOL, pursuant to its authority under ERISA,68 has
adopted a number of additional exemptions.69 Indeed, issuing such
exemptions is arguably the DOL's signal role in terms of administering
ERISA, given that, apart from its authority to adopt exemptions and
define terms, Congress granted the DOL little substantive authority
under the statute. 70 As a result of its circumscribed authority, for
example, the DOL cannot establish its own prohibited transaction
rules-or, at least it cannot do so directly.71 As the next subpart
discusses, however, in 2016 the DOL used its powers to define terms
and exempt otherwise prohibited transactions to establish, indirectly,
new requirements that are substantially changing the way that the
securities markets operate.
A final point bears mentioning. ERISA largely pertains only to
employee benefit plans; it does not cover IRAs or, therefore, IRA
fiduciaries' obligations as to those accounts. 72 This is consistent with
the fact that employee benefit plans, but not IRAs, are closely related
to the statute's eponymous goal of ensuring "employee retirement
income security." Rather, another statute entirely-the Internal
Revenue Code-covers [RAs and contains fiduciary provisions that
closely mirror ERISA's.73 However, although the Internal Revenue
Service is generally responsible for administering the Code, a 1978
executive statement granted the DOL authority, equivalent to its
authority under ERISA, to interpret the fiduciary definition under the
Code and to adopt prohibited transaction exemptions covering advice
67. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (2012) ("Exemptions from prohibited
transactions"). Under one of the more important statutory exemptions, a party-in-interest
may enter into certain types of transactions with a plan so long as the plan pays the party no
more than "reasonable compensation." Id.
68. See id. Specifically, the DOL may grant an exemption if the exemption is
"(1) administratively feasible, (2) in the interests of the plan and of its participants and
beneficiaries, and (3) protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of such plan."
Id.
69. See Class Exemptions, U.S. DEP'T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/
employers-and-advisers/guidance/exemptions/class (last visited Aug. 31, 2017) (listing the
DOL's exemptions under ERISA).
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (delegating authority to the DOL).
71. See id. §§ 1108, 1135.
72. See Important ERISA Issues, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/exam-
guide/series-66/retirement-plans/erisa-issues.asp (last visited Aug. 31, 2017) ("IRAs are not
subject to ERISA, since an IRA is not considered an employer plan.").
73. See 26 U.S.C. § 4975(c) ("Tax on prohibited transactions").
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that fiduciaries provide to IRAs. 74 Accordingly, most of the DOL's
rules under ERISA-those pertaining to fiduciaries, at least-
encompass both employee benefit plan participants and IRA owners.
Given that trillions of dollars are now invested through IRAs, 75 this
expanded rulemaking authority renders the DOIs recent rulemaking
all the more troublesome.
B. The Fiduciary Rule
As the previous subpart details, an adviser that qualifies as a
fiduciary under ERISA becomes subject to a wide array of
constraints, all of which are aimed at ensuring the fiduciary's
undivided loyalty to the employee benefit plans that she advises.
Until recently, only those advisers who met the definition of
"investment adviser" under the securities laws-and whom the SEC
regulates under those laws-fell within the definition of ERISA
fiduciary and became subject to the associated obligations. In 2016,
however, the DOL adopted a new rule that brings a wholly different
type of adviser within the definition of fiduciary, subjecting them to
the prohibited transaction rules to which many registered investment
advisers have long been subject. These other advisers are securities
brokers, who have traditionally operated in a manner very different
from how registered investment advisers have operated.
Securities brokers, who are regulated under the securities laws as
"broker-dealers,"7 6 specialize in transacting in securities, whereby
they stand between buyers and sellers of securities. 77 However, they
frequently also provide investment advice to these buyers and sellers
of securities.78 Indeed, many financial firms whose names we often
associate with investment advisory services rather than transaction
execution services, including Edward Jones and Charles Schwab, are
74. See Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (Oct. 16, 1978),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 237 (2012), and in 92 Stat. 3790 (1978).
75. See Thornton, supra note 4 ("IRAs account for the greatest share of [retirement]
assets at $7.6 trillion .... ).
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o.
77. See Lisa Smith, What Is a "Broker-Dealer" and Why Should You Care?,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/072913/what-brokerdealer-
and-why-should-you-care.asp (last visited Aug. 31, 2017) (noting that "[a] broker executes
orders on behalf of clients" and "facilitates security trading as an 'agent' acting on behalf of
investors").
78. See id. ("[Full-service brokers] provid[e] specific investment recommendations in
addition to planning and advice services that range from retirement planning, long-term care
planning and estate planning to the formulation of personal investment strategy . . . .").
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regulated not as investment advisers but as broker-dealers. Under the
securities laws, these firms are able to provide investment advice
without having to be regulated as investment advisers so long as such
advice is solely incidental to the firms' brokerage services, and the
firms receive no special compensation for providing it.79 Moreover,
unless a brokerage firm is also regulated as an investment adviser,
neither it nor its advisory personnel-that is, its individual brokers-
are fiduciaries to their customers.80 This means that, in making
investment recommendations, they need not have a single-minded
focus on their customers' best interests,81 a circumstance that is
consistent with the notion that, fundamentally, a broker's purpose is
not to provide investment advice but, rather, to sell securities. Simply
put, brokers are salespersons.
Historically, many retirement investors who obtained investment
advice in connection with their securities transactions did so from
securities brokers, rather than from registered investment advisers,
notwithstanding that the former were not subject to fiduciary
obligations.82 For one thing, the investment advice that securities
brokers dispensed was generally more affordable than advice provided
by investment advisers.83 Because brokers could receive transaction-
based compensation-in the form of commissions or, to the extent
they recommended particular mutual funds, sales loads, revenue-
sharing payments, or so-called 12b-1 fees-their customers bore a
79. See Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers
Should Be Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REv. 707, 723 (2012).
80. See Brett Carson, Is Your Financial Advisor a Fiduciary?, U.S. NEWS: MoNEY
(Mar. 19, 2015, 12:38 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-smarter-mutual-fund-
investor/2015/03/19/is-your-financial-advisor-a-fiduciary (observing that "broker dealers"
are not subject to a "fiduciary standard").
81. See id. Nonetheless, under Exchange Act and FINRA rules, securities brokers
must act in accordance with (nonfiduciary) standards of conduct, including that any
recommendation that a customer transact in a particular security or pursue a particular
investment strategy be "suitable" for the customer, in light of the customer's particular
circumstances, such wealth, age, investment experience, and financial needs. See Laby,
supra note 79, at 710 ("When recommending securities, a broker-dealer owes a duty of
suitability, which is a duty to ensure that an investment recommendation or strategy is
suitable for a particular individual at a particular time.").
82. See Maxey, supra note 22 (discussing concerns associated with brokers'
provision of investment advice).
83. See Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 14, at 32 ("[C]onsumers with
'low trading activity and no need for ongoing monitoring or advice' fare better with a
transaction-based model rather than a[n] [asset]-based model because the latter is more costly
and results in recurring charges." (citation omitted)).
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one-time cost for the advice they received. 84 This form of
compensation stood in contrast to the compensation associated with
registered investment advisers, who typically receive an ongoing fee,
usually paid monthly or quarterly, based on the amount of assets as to
which they provide advice.85 For most retirement investors, brokers'
pay-as-you-go format worked better than an asset-based model,
because these investors generally do not buy and sell securities
frequently but instead pursue traditional buy-and-hold strategies. 86
In addition, most retirement investors are financially precluded
from engaging the services of registered investment advisers, who
typically require that their clients have a minimum amount of assets as
to which they desire investment advice.87 These requirements arise
from the fact that registered investment advisers generally provide
comprehensive advisory services on a continuous basis. Accordingly,
it is often not cost effective for them to advise small accounts.88
Securities brokers, by contrast, generally have not imposed minimum
asset requirements-and, indeed, there has been no need for them to
do so, given a business model in which a onetime recommendation
was exchanged for a onetime fee.
84. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (describing the types of
(transaction-based) compensation that brokers receive).
85. See Daisy Maxey, How To Pay Your Financial Adviser, WALL ST. J.: WEALTH
MGMT. (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-pay-your-financial-adviser- 137
8302678 (describing asset-based fees).
86. See Jason Van Bergen, Paying Your Investment Advisor-Fees or
Commissions?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articlesibasics/04/022704.asp
(last visited Sept. 1, 2017) (noting that transaction-based fees are often more appropriate than
asset-based fees "in the case of a smaller portfolio where less active management is
required"). To be sure, transaction-based compensation may create risks. Most notably, an
adviser may engage in "churning," whereby the adviser seeks to increase the aggregate fees
she receives by advising customers to trade more frequently than what would best serve the
customers' interests. See id. ("[T]o increase their commissions, some brokers practice
churning, the unethical practice of excessively buying and selling securities in a client's
account."). However, asset-based compensation creates a risk of "reverse churning,"
whereby an adviser makes too few recommendations, knowing that she will be paid her
periodic fee either way. See Judith Bums, Financial Planners Ask SEC To Limit Brokers'
Role, WALL ST. J.: MONEY (June 23, 2004, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB108794599485744704 ("While [asset]-based accounts eliminate incentives for brokers to
engage in ... churning, critics say the accounts have spawned 'reverse churning,' in which
... customers pay hefty asset-based fees and get little in return.").
87. See Maxey, supra note 85 ("Many asset-based advisers require account
minimums of at least $500,000 to $1 million, shutting many investors out.").
88. See Marla Brill, How To Afford an Investment Adviser Without Breaking the
Bank, REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2011, 9:41 AM), www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-investing-
adviser/how-to-afford-an-investment-adviser-without-breaking-the-bank-idUSTRE7BC1AN
20111213.
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Regardless of whether retirement investors were well or poorly
served by securities brokers' decades-old business model and the
transaction-based compensation on which it relied, the question is
now moot. The DOL's fiduciary rule requires that brokers-as newly
anointed fiduciaries to any employee benefit plan participants or IRA
owners they might advise-change how they operate because, like all
ERISA fiduciaries, they are now prohibited from receiving
transaction-based compensation.89 Such compensation is problematic
under ERISA because, among other reasons, its amount typically
varies based on the particular security, fund, or other product that a
broker might recommend and sell. It is differential, in the DOIs
characterization.90 Because a broker is able to be paid more simply by
recommending and selling particular securities over others as to
which she would receive less (or no) compensation, it generates the
sorts of conflicts of interest that ERISA's prohibited transaction
provisions forbid.91
Yet, given the DOI's limited authority under ERISA, the
Department could not frame the rule as a simple proclamation that
securities brokers who advise employee benefit plans or IRA accounts
were now fiduciaries subject to the prohibited transaction rules.92
Rather, using the tools it had, it redefined what constitutes giving
investment advice for purposes of ERISA's definition of fiduciary.
More specifically, it replaced the definition that it had adopted in
1975-which, recall, accorded with the definition of investment
advice under the securities laws93-with a much more encompassing
89. See Zanotti, supra note 21, at 5 (observing that under the fiduciary rule,
"[wlithout ... an exemption, a plan fiduciary would not be able to ... recommend[] a
product with a sales charge that is paid to the fiduciary, without engaging in a prohibited
transaction").
90. See Jan S. Kopelman, DOL Issues Final Fiduciary Rule and Related Exemptions,
DLA PIPER (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2016/04/
dol-issues-fmal-fiduciary-rule/ (noting that the fiduciary rule prohibits a financial institution's
use of "quotas, appraisals, performance or personnel actions, bonuses, contests, special
awards, differential compensation or other actions or incentives that are intended or would
reasonably be expected to cause advisers to make recommendations that are not in the best
interest of a Retirement Investor").
91. See Maxey, supra note 85 ("When advisers act as brokers, they have an incentive
to sell the product that pays the best commission.").
92. Cf Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 14, at 5-6 (asserting that with
the fiduciary rule, "the [DOL] ... has sought to promulgate this new regulatory regime
through its exemptive authority under ERISA" and "seeks to convert its authority to li
regulatory burdens into a means to impose them").
93. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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definition. 94 Under this new definition, an adviser provides
investment advice to a retirement investor if, among other things, in
exchange for a fee or other compensation, she recommends particular
securities, investment strategies, or portfolio allocations to the
investor.95 Because the new definition does not require an agreement
or other understanding between an adviser and her customer or that
the adviser provide advice on a regular basis, it encompasses the
informal and sporadic relationships that often exist between brokers
and their customers.
Nevertheless, in a formal nod to the concern that subjecting
securities brokers to ERISA's fiduciary obligations would too
dramatically impact brokers' businesses, the DOL adopted an
exemption-the best-interest contract (BIC) exemption-that would
permit advisers to continue to receive transaction-based compensation
under certain circumstances. The most important of the BIC
exemption's many requirements is that an adviser seeking to rely on it
must adhere to "standards of fiduciary conduct and fair dealing" that
their customers are entitled to enforce.96 In addition, an adviser
whose customers are IRA owners-which describes most brokers
affected by the fiduciary rule97-must enter into an enforceable
contract with each customer.98 The contract must contain, among
other things, extensive representations and warranties by the adviser
and extensive disclosures, including regarding all fees and other costs
that the customer will bear in connection with a recommended
94. See Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,997 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pts. 2509, 2510, 2550) (setting forth the DOL's revised interpretation of "investment
advice").
95. See id.
96. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002, 21,003 (Apr. 8, 2016).
97. This is because employee benefit plan participants generally do not receive
investment advice in connection with their decisions regarding investing their assets. See
Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today:
Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 48 (2000) (observing that employee
benefit plan sponsors generally avoid engaging advisers to assist participants in their
investment decisionmaking because doing so subjects the sponsors "to potential co-fiduciary
liability"). Accordingly, to the extent that a securities broker provides advice as to the
investment of retirement assets, those assets are usually held in IRA accounts. Cf Michael
Wong, How the DOL's Fiduciary Rule Will Affect Advisors, Investors, MORNINGSTAR (May
31, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://www.morningstar.com/cover/videocenter.aspx?id=755683
(noting that the fiduciary rule the rule "primarily affects approximately $3 trillion of advised
IRA assets").
98. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. at 21,003 ("In the case of IRAs
and non-ERISA plans, the exemption requires that the [fiduciary] standards be set forth ih an
enforceable contract with the Retirement Investor.").
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transaction and the manner in which the relevant brokerage firm
compensates its advisory personnel, and cannot include a class action
waiver or require arbitration of individual claims in distant locations. 99
The BIC exemption, however, does little to alleviate the effects
of the fiduciary rule. As an initial matter, as some commentators have
noted, the exemption may be so onerous as to be unusable.' 00 Yet even
without many of its requirements, its usefulness would be open to
question: although the exemption permits an adviser to receive
transaction-based compensation, to the extent that the compensation
differs depending on the particular securities an adviser recommends,
the difference must be based on neutral factors 0 '-which presumably
means such factors as the amount of time or analytical effort the
adviser put into making the recommendation. 102 In other words,
compensation cannot be based on the fact that an issuer simply agreed
with the adviser or the brokerage firm with which the adviser is
affiliated to pay a higher commission or other fee than did another
issuer. Because the BIC exemption requires that differential
compensation be based on time and effort (or other neutral
differences), it is less an exemption than an alternate route through
which securities professionals may comply with ERISA's stringent
fiduciary obligations.
III. REGULATORY DAMAGE
The fiduciary rule has profound implications for both investors
and the securities markets, in that financial advisers who previously
were not subject to ERISA's onerous fiduciary obligations must now
choose between modifying their business structures to accommodate
their new responsibilities and ceasing to advise retirement investors
altogether. However, despite the extended concern that the rule has
99. See id. at 21,078-80. Under certain circumstances, moreover, brokers must also
document, in writing, the reasons for each recommendation. See id. at 21,003.
100. See AM. RET. ASS'N, FIDUCIARY RULE RE-PROPOSAL COMPLIANCE COSTS
OUTWEIGH BENEFITS 1, http://www.ntsa-net.org/Portals/4/15.05.05%20Fiduciary/`2ORule%
20TPs%20FINAL%20-%20ARA.PDF (last visited Aug. 26, 2017) (opining that the BIC
exemption "is prescriptive, onerous and unworkable"); Charles Paikert, How DoL Rule May
Impact Mutual Funds, FIN. PLAN. (June 20, 2016, 10:40 AM), http://www.fmancial-planning.
com/news/how-dol-rule-may-impact-mutual-funds (noting that advisers likely will not use
the BIC exemption because of its "onerous requirements").
101. See Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. at 21,036.
102. See Zanotti, supra note 21, at 8 (listing "the difference in time it took the adviser
to analyze and provide the advice with respect to different types of investments" as "neutral
factors").
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caused, certain probable-and harmful--effects of the rule have
largely escaped detection. In particular, as Part L.A details, because
the fiduciary rule incentivizes newly minted fiduciaries to ensure that
aggregate advisory costs borne by retirement investors are as low as
possible, these advisers are increasingly recommending passively
managed investment strategies and products, avoiding (generally more
expensive) actively managed alternatives.103 In addition, as Part ILI.B
describes, as a result of this greater market-wide emphasis on
passivity, the fiduciary rule also portends a fundamental and
worrisome transformation of the role of investment advice in the
securities markets-a transformation that will further widen the
disparity between retail and sophisticated investors, in terms of
investment opportunities and returns.
A. The DOL's Investment Strategy
In the new world, in which all financial advisers are fiduciaries
to the retirement investors that they advise, advisers must either begin
using a compensation model that is not transaction-based or submit to
the extensive requirements of the BIC exemption. Regardless of
which approach advisers choose, the changes will almost assuredly
propel consequential shifts in the allocation of investment assets,
substantially increasing the amount allocated to passively managed
investment strategies and substantially decreasing the amount
allocated to actively managed strategies.104 Indeed, according to one
estimate, by 2021 the rule will have directed over $1.5 trillion into
exchange-traded funds (ETFs) alone.105 After describing passive
investment management and how it differs from active management,
this subpart details why the fiduciary rule will likely spur a substantial
increase in the amount of assets managed passively.
103. See Melanie Waddell, DOL, SEC Fee Scrutiny Sparks Shift to Passive Investing,
THINKADVISOR (July 28, 2016), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/07/28/dol-sec-fee-
scrutiny-sparks-shift-to-passive-inves?page-all=1.
104. See Madison Marriage, Obama's 'Fiduciary Rule' Adds to Active Fund Woes,
FIN. TIEs (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/8c88aafc-6528-11e6-8310-ecftb
ddad227 (citing various commentators who believe that the fiduciary rule "will accelerate the
movement of money out of active strategies and into cheaper passive alternatives").
105. See BROWN BROS. HARRIMAN, EXCHANGE THOUGHTS: DOL FIDUCIARY RULE
COULD PROPEL $1.5 TRILLION INTO ETFS (June 6, 2016), https://www.bbh.com/blob/16322/
6af3a6ffcab0b27af985c6a09cc4754a/exchange-thoughts--dol-fiduciary-rule-could-propel--
1-5-trillion-into-etfs-pdf-data.pdf.
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1. Passive Management
Increasingly, amidst the din of disclosures and marketing pitches
directed at investors, there is one insistent message: passively
managed strategies are best. In other words, investors should aim to
put their capital in ETFs, index funds, and related products that hold
portfolios consisting of all securities within designated markets or
indices and that do not distinguish among particular securities within
those markets or indices.10 6 Because the securities in a passively
managed fund's portfolio should be the same as those within the
relevant market or index, the fund's performance over a given period
should be the same as the performance of that market or index.10 7 By
contrast, funds managed pursuant to actively managed strategies
invest in only those securities that the funds' managers expect to have
superior performance relative to other securities in the same market or
index.108
Economists and asset managers have extolled the virtues of
passive management, arguing that investors can hope to do no better
than achieve the performance of the securities market as a whole (or,
at least, particular components of it).109 These passivity advocates
106. See Dennis K. Berman & Jamie Heller, Wall Street's "Do-Nothing" Investing
Revolution, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2016, 10:30 AM), http://graphics.wsj.com/passivists/
("Government mandates, lawsuits and an ever-more available slew of mounting data are
leading managers to turn to passive investing as the lower-cost, default options for more
Americans each year."); Anne Tergesen & Jason Zweig, The Dying Business of Picking
Stocks, WALL ST. J.: MKTS. (Oct. 17, 2016, 12:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-
dying-business-of-picking-stocks-1476714749 (noting that "[p]ension funds, endowments,
401(k) retirement plans and retail investors are flooding into passive investment funds, which
run on autopilot by tracking an index," while "[s]tock pickers ... are being pushed to the
margins").
107. See Active vs. Passive Investing: Which Approach Offers Better Returns?,
WHARTON SCH.: ARESTY INST. ExEcunvE EDUc., http://executiveeducation.wharton.upenn.
edu/thought-leadership/wharton-wealth-management-initiative/wmi-thought-leadership/active-
vs-passive-investing-which-approach-offers-better-returns (last visited Sept. 1, 2017)
(referring to "passive investing" as an approach whereby investors "duplicat[e] market
returns instead of trying to beat them").
108. See Active Management, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/
activemanagement.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2017) (observing that "[a]ctive management is
the use of a human element, such as a single manager, co-managers or a team of managers, to
actively manage a fund's portfolio" and that "[a]ctive managers rely on analytical research,
forecasts, and their own judgment and experience in making investment decisions on what
securities to buy, hold and sell").
109. See Active Versus Passive Investing, EvANSON ASSET MGMT., https://www.evan
sonasset.com/2.htm (last updated Aug. 2017) ("The 'smart' money uses passive investment
strategies."); Spencer Jakab, Are Fund Managers Doomed? Making the Case for Passive
Investing's Triumph, WALL ST. J.: MKTS. (Oct. 18, 2016, 10:13 AM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/are-fund-managers-doomed-making-the-case-for-passive-investings-triumph-147679
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concede that, within any market and for any period, actively managed
portfolios will collectively achieve the same returns as those achieved
by a passively managed portfolio. They note, however, that particular
actively managed portfolios will perform better than the passively
managed portfolio, while others will perform more poorly. 110
Accordingly, because the profit earned in some actively managed
portfolios will be at the expense of other actively managed portfolios,
active management in any given market is a zero-sum game."' In
addition, once the higher fees of managers of actively managed
strategies are taken into account, passively managed portfolios, which
are typically subject to lower fees, will outperform many of the
actively managed portfolios that had achieved superior performance
before deducting fees.112
The notion that passive management is preferable to active
management also has strong support from dominant theories about
how markets function. In particular, the efficient capital markets
theory (ECMT) holds that in efficient markets, all publicly available
information about a security is reflected in the security's market
price.113 Implications of the theory are, first, that required disclosure
under the securities laws and all other publicly available information
about a company have no direct relevance for most investors because
that information is already reflected in the company's market price
and, second, that most investors cannot hope to surpass market returns
in their investing activities because it is impossible for them to gain an
8977 (countering arguments against passive management); William F. Sharpe, Indexed
Investing: A Prosaic Way To Beat the Average Investor (May 1, 2002), https://web.stanford.
edu/~wfsharpe/art/talks/indexedjinvesting.htm (discussing the advantages of index funds and
ETFs).
110. See Sharpe, supra note 109 (observing that because passively managed portfolios
achieve the same return as the market, the average actively managed portfolio necessarily
also achieves that return).
111. See Index Investing Makes Markets and Economies More Efficient, PHIL. EcoN.
(May 1, 2016), http://www.philosophicaleconomics.com/2016/05/passive/ ("[S]econdary
market trading and investing is a zero-sum game for the participants [in that] [flor a given
market participant to outperform, some other market participant has to underperform.").
112. See Sharpe, supra note 109 (asserting that active managers' fees and costs "are
likely to be at least 1.0% (100 basis points) higher than those of passive managers in the same
markets" and that this difference impacts relative after-cost returns).
113. See Efficient Market Hypothesis-EMH, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.
com/tenns/e/efficientmarkethypothesis.asp (last visited Aug. 29, 2017) ("The efficient
market hypothesis (EMH) is an investment theory that states it is impossible to 'beat the
market' because stock market efficiency causes existing share prices to always incorporate
and reflect all relevant information.").
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informational edge over other investors.114 In other words, the ECMT
holds that average investors-those who are not financial
professionals-cannot "beat" the market.,15 And if that is the case,
then investing passively is the only reasonable investment option for
them.
As one might expect, at various times and in various contexts,
economists, scholars, and jurists have argued about the extent to
which the theory accurately describes the public securities markets,
including the extent to which market prices respond to public
information; whether, even if they do, that response produces prices
that might be considered accurate; and, even if it does, what
"accurate" means in this context.116 As one might further expect,
these discussions have not produced answers on which all can agree.
However, most observers generally can agree on the principle that,
where markets for particular securities are relatively efficient, prices
move in response to transactions in those securities, which, for their
part, often occur in response to the release of information. This
principle, put another way, is simply that efficient markets react to
information.11 7
Despite the range of views on the accuracy of the ECMT, the
United States Supreme Court, without explicitly endorsing the theory,
has for decades embraced its contentions and conclusions. 118
According to the Court in the securities fraud case Halliburton Co. v.
Erica P John Fund, Inc., because "market professionals generally
consider most publicly announced material statements about
companies, thereby affecting stock market prices,",19 we can conclude
that "most investors . . . will rely on [a] security's market price as an
unbiased assessment of the security's value in light of all public
114. See Jason Van Bergen, Efficient Market Hypothesis: Is the Stock Market
Efficient?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articlesIbasics/04/022004.asp (last
visited Aug. 31, 2017) ("[U]nder the efficient market hypothesis, no single investor is ever
able to attain greater profitability than another with the same amount of invested funds: their
equal possession of information means they can only achieve identical returns.").
115. See id. ("[U]nder the efficient market hypothesis, no investor should ever be able
to beat the market, or the average annual returns that all investors and funds are able to
achieve using their best efforts.").
116. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2403 (2014).
117. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 n.24 (1988) ("For purposes of
accepting the presumption [that in transacting in public securities, investors rely on the
integrity of market prices] in this case, we need only believe that market professionals
generally consider most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby
affecting stock market prices.").
118. See id. at 246-47 n.24.
119. 134 S. Ct. at 2410 (quoting Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 247 n. 24).
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information." 120 In other words, because, in a "well-developed
market'" publicly available information becomes incorporated into a
security's price, courts should presume that, in transacting in the
security, investors rely on the "integrity" of that price.1 21 The further
implication of the Court's analysis is that, because a security's market
price reflects its actual value, most investors' portfolios can achieve
market returns but cannot do better than that.
2. The Push for Passivity
Of course, neither experts' explicit advocacy of passive
management nor the Supreme Court's implicit endorsement of it has
any particular implications for how financial advisers counsel their
retirement-investor customers or how retirement investors deploy their
investment assets. The fiduciary rule, by contrast, is substantially
more potent on both scores, in that it may be expected to significantly
increase the amount of assets that investors allocate to passively
managed strategies. More specifically, in two different ways, the rule
encourages advisers who, prior to the rule's adoption, had not been
ERISA fiduciaries to advise their retirement-investor customers to
invest in passively managed funds and other products.
First, because of the fiduciary rule's effect on the fees charged by
advisers, advisers are increasingly advising their customers to invest
in passively managed products in order to maintain customers and
market share.122 As Part II notes, the fiduciary rule prohibits advisers'
receipt of transaction-based compensation, unless they comply with
the myriad requirements of the BIC exemption.123 Advisers who
deem the BIC exemption too onerous or otherwise objectionable are
therefore transitioning to an asset-based compensation model, in
which they are paid a certain percentage of the amount of assets as to
which they provide investment advice.124 As noted, however, asset-
120. Id. at 2409, 2411 (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S.
455, 462 (2013)).
121. Id. at 2409-11.
122. See Waddell, supra note 103 (describing the shift in assets from actively
managed products to passively managed ones and citing the fiduciary rule as a cause).
123. See supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text (discussing the rule's expected
impact on the traditional securities brokerage business model).
124. See Mitchell H. Caplan, The Future of Advisors Is Fee-Based and Tech
Obsessed, FINANCIALPLANNING (May 11, 2016), http://www.fmancial-planning.com/opinion/
the-future-of-advisers-is-fee-based-and-tech-obsessed (noting that "[t]he advisory industry
has been moving from commission-based sales to fee-based and fee-only advice, and the
pace is accelerating" and suggesting that the fiduciary rule is fueling the shift, at least in part).
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based fees are generally more expensive for customers-particularly
those who do not trade frequently-in part because they are payable
on an ongoing basis.125 Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that
customers who have historically been subject to per transaction fees
but who wish to avoid paying more for investment assistance may
forgo advice altogether and to fend for themselves in the securities
markets-a phenomenon that the United Kingdom has experienced in
connection with regulators' adoption of a rule similar to the fiduciary
rule.12 6
To stanch this potential outflow of customers, advisers are
seeking to lower the aggregate fees that a customer must bear. Not
only are customers typically subject to the fee charged by their
advisers, whether those fees be transaction-based or asset-based, but
in their capacities as investors, they are also subject to their pro rata
portion of the fees charged by the managers of each mutual fund or
other investment product in which they invest.127 Advisers have
recognized that, given the higher advisory fees that customers would
now otherwise pay as a result of the fiduciary rule, recommending
that they invest in lower-fee funds and products can help make up the
difference.128 And, as a general matter, the fees associated with
passively managed funds are lower than the fees associated with
actively managed ones because the former are less expensive to
manage and operate than the latter.129 After all, active management
requires that fund managers actively research and conduct due
diligence on securities and other investment opportunities, which is
125. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
126. See Mark Schoeff Jr., DOL Fiduciary Opponents Point to UK Experience To
Bolster Their Case, INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 19, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.investment
news.com/article/20140319/FREE/140319907/dol-fiduciary-opponents-point-to-uk-experience-
to-bolster-their-case; HM TREASURY & FIN. CoNDUcr AuTH., FINANCIAL ADVICE MARKET
REVIEW: FINAL REPORT 5-8 (Mar. 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/famr-
final-report.pdf (discussing how many investors cannot "currently afford to access the advice
they need at a price they are willing or able to pay," in part because of the "move to fee-based
advice on retail investment products").
127. See BROWN BROS. HARIMAN, supra note 105 ("While investors will pay a fee to
their advisor for their service, they are also charged the management fees from the underlying
funds the advisor invests in.").
128. See Tergesen & Zweig, supra note 106 (observing that the fiduciary rule will
require "[fjinancial advisers overseeing individual retirement accounts ... to demonstrate
that their decisions are in the best interests of their clients" and that these advisers "can help
keep overall costs down" by "using index funds in accounts ... bearing an [asset-based]
fee").
129. See id. ("[BJecause matching the performance of stock indexes is far cheaper
than trying to beat them, index funds' expenses are a fraction of what active funds charge-
sometimes 1/30th or less.").
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often expensive in terms of personnel and overhead, and to make
investment decisions based on those efforts.130 Passive management,
on the other hand, involves neither investment selection nor, therefore,
the associated costs.
Second, the fact that the fiduciary rule (through the BIC
exemption) permits customers to bring class action lawsuits against
their advisers for breach of their fiduciary duties may similarly
incentivize advisers who rely on the exemption to recommend low-
fee, passively managed products more frequently than they had
previously.131 To appreciate why this is so, recall that the DOI's
concern in adopting the rule was that, due to conflicts of interests,
nonfiduciary advisers did not always recommend products that served
their customers' best interests.132 Accordingly, an adviser who has
been sued for breaching her fiduciary duties must show that her
recommendation was, in fact, in the relevant customers' best interests.
That may be a more daunting task to the extent that the adviser has
recommended higher-fee products, such as actively managed mutual
funds, over lower-fee, passively managed options. In other words,
advisers' recommendations of passively managed products, by
producing lower fees for customers, will likely reduce the risk that
advisers are sued for breaches of their fiduciary duties and, if they are
sued, the risk that they will lose or otherwise be subject to damages.
To be sure, the magnitude of the fiduciary rule's impact in
driving investment capital to passively managed strategies is unclear
and will remain unclear for some time. What is clear, however, is that
the movement has already begun, accompanied by numerous
financial professionals' endorsement of passive management as a
means of curbing investment costs that are certain to increase as a
result of the rule.133 Therefore, it is also clear that, with the fiduciary
130. See SPDR UNIv., How To INVEST YOUR PORTFOLIO USING PASSIVE AND ACTIVE
MANAGEMENT 1 (2010), http://www.lindajblack.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/How_to_
InvestYourPortfolioUsingPassive and_ActiveManagementl.pdf ("[T]o support
necessary research and an active trading infrastructure, actively-managed funds spend more
money on overhead and staffing, costs that may be reflected in the higher fees charged by
active managers .... ).
131. See BROWN BROS. HARRIMAN, supra note 105 ("Given the added litigation risk,
advisors may increasingly use lower-cost products like ETFs to reduce the burden of
justifying recommendations for higher-priced products.").
132. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
133. See Madison Marriage, Passive Funds Take Third of U.S. Market, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/4cdf2f88-7695-11e6-b6Oa-de4532d5ea35
(observing that "[t]raditional active fund houses including Franklin Templeton, Legg Mason,
Janus Capital and Fidelity have ... launch[ed] their own benchmark-tracking products, or
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rule, the DOL has effectively adopted its own preferred investment
strategy and imposed it on large swaths of retirement investors. This
result is acutely problematic not only because neither the DOL nor
any other regulator is competent to provide investment advice, but
also because the Department's preferred strategy may, in many
circumstances, counter investors' best interests rather than further
them.134 As Part IV explains, this result is also inimical to securities
regulation's role in the financial markets.
B. The DOL's Market Distortion
The DOEs implicit promotion of a particular investment
approach is problematic if only because it is contrary to established
notions of how securities markets should operate in generally
capitalist societies. Yet there is an additional reason to be concerned
about the DOLs implicit promotion of passive management: it
threatens a further stratification of investors, in which sophisticated
investors have the benefit of guidance from fiduciaries and a
spectrum of investment opportunities, while retail investors, including
most retirement investors, do not. Showing how this is so, this
subpart first engages in a thought experiment that reveals how the
fiduciary rule, through its promotion of passive management,
implicitly disclaims any continued need for investment advice or
fiduciary duties. The subpart then posits that this radical investment
posture militates against retirement investors' participation in the
securities markets and thereby constricts their ability to achieve the
returns that such participation can produce.
1. A Thought Experiment
Legislative history shows that, in drafting the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act), 135 the securities statute that
governs registered investment advisers, Congress had a particular
conception of the investment process. In that conception, investment
advisers performed the important service of guiding investors in the
sound investment of their assets-a service that was all the more
acquir[ed] smaller passive specialists" to better compete with managers offering lower-cost,
passively managed products); Tergesen & Zweig, supra note 106 (noting that "[o]ver the past
three years, Fidelity ... has launched nearly two-dozen index mutual funds and ETFs" and
citing the fiduciary rule as a contributing factor).
134. See Karmel, supra note 31, at 436 ("[N]either the SEC nor the DOL has the
competence to determine what advice is in the best interest of the clients.").
135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2012).
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important given the losses that many investors had suffered in the
market crash that precipitated the Great Depression.136 Congress
further believed that an investment adviser's relationship with her
client-the term the Advisers Act uses to refer to a registered
investment adviser's customer-was necessarily a personal one,
through which the adviser provided advice tailored to the client's
particular needs and objectives.137 The Supreme Court affirmed this
notion in Lowe v. SEC138 and in SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc.,1 39 its two cases to date evaluating the nature of advice
provided by a registered investment adviser.140
The conception of investment advisers as professionals that work
closely with each client to develop an investment program consonant
with the client's particular needs and objectives is a conception of
active management. "Active," after all, is a label that attaches to a
wide range of investment and trading strategies and
recommendations-all those, in fact, that do not aim to track the
performance of a particular market or index. 141 This wide range is the
expected product of the fact that no single investment approach is
right for everyone and that investors must separately evaluate
investment options and determine which ones are most suitable for
them, given their particular circumstances. Accordingly, active
management contemplates that each investor's investment choices-
and investment returns-will differ from those of any other investor.
136. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)
("[The Advisers Act] was the last in a series of Acts designed to eliminate certain abuses in
the securities industry, abuses which were found to have contributed to the stock market
crash of 1929 and the depression of the 1930s.").
137. This notion gained support from the many investment advisers who testified in
committee hearings on the Advisers Act, who helped shape Congress's belief "that [a] highly
personal relationship is of the very essence" of an investment adviser's relationship to her
client. See Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of
the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 76th Cong. 743 (1940) (statement of Rudolf P. Berle,
General Counsel, Investment Counsel Association of America).
138. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 204 (1985).
139. 375 U.S. at 180, 191.
140. See id. at 191-92 (quoting 2 Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1412 (2d ed.
1961)) ("The [Advisers Act] reflects a congressional recognition 'of the delicate fiduciary
nature of an investment advisory relationship."'); Lowe, 472 U.S. at 207-08 ("The [Advisers]
Act was designed to apply to those persons engaged in the investment-advisory profession-
those who provide personalized advice attuned to a client's concerns . . . .").
141. See Daniel Solin, Is There a Case for Actively Managed Funds? NO: There Are
Winners, but Good Luck Picking Them, WALL ST. J.: WEALTH MGlviT. (Mar. 1, 2015, 11:37
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/are-index-funds-really-better-than-actively-managed-142
5271058.
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Of course, even passively managed products cannot (for now) be
completely passive, holding appropriately weighted positions in every
publicly traded security worldwide. 142 Accordingly, passively
managed strategies involve at least two types of actively made
decisions. First, before any passively managed fund can begin
operating, its manager must actively select the particular market or
index that will define the fund's portfolio and determine its
investment performance.143 Second, by choosing to buy shares of a
particular fund, an investor actively chooses to have exposure to a
particular market or index, at the expense of having exposure to other
markets or indices.144 Although, in theory, investors whose portfolios
comprise passively managed funds will earn "market" returns, the fact
that passive management involves actively made decisions means that
the performance of each investor's portfolio will differ from the
performance of all other investors' portfolios and from the
performance of the global, all-encompassing securities market.
But what if passive management could be purely passive? In
other words, what would be the fiduciary rule's implications if the
factors that inhibit pure passivity45 did not exist and if, therefore,
passively managed strategies involved no actively made decisions at
all? Considering this question is instructive because of what it reveals
about how the fiduciary rule may ultimately constrict the resources
available to most retirement investors in allocating their portfolio
assets. It is instructive also for what it reveals about the unintended
consequences of regulation that is insufficiently informed by the
markets to which it applies.
This, then, is the thought experiment. If all passively managed
funds were purely passive, holding positions in every security
worldwide, exclusive of any component of active management, then
there would remain no role at all for investment advice, as that term
has been historically understood. That is, if we assume that advice
142. See Cullen Roche, The Myth of Passive Investing, PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM,
http://www.pragcap.com/the-myth-of-passive-investing/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2017) ("[W]hen
viewed through a macro lens, we all must be active asset pickers . ... because all investors
deviate from global cap weighting and essentially pick micro components of the global
financial asset portfolio.").
143. See id.
144. See id. (noting that because "any asset allocator usually begins with cash or no
assets at all," the decision to "allocat[e] to other assets is inherently active").
145. That passively managed funds cannot be purely passive is more likely a logistical
necessity, arising from the limitations of technology and financial product design, than a
theoretical necessity.
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constitutes "investment advice" only if it is given within the confines
of a personal relationship and is tailored to the particular client or
customer to whom it is directed, then such advice is superfluous in a
purely passively managed universe because each separate investor that
consults a particular adviser should receive the same
recommendations. There simply is no personalization or tailoring to
do.146 Additionally, all investors in this universe should have the same
ultimate holdings and earn nearly identical returns over any given
period, regardless of their individual circumstances. Perhaps just as
important, if investment advice in such a universe is obsolete, then so
are the fiduciary duties that accompany it. After all, if there is only
one investment option, then the concept of duties that can be either
upheld or breached is meaningless.
A further implication of this thought experiment is that, with the
fiduciary rule, the DOL will have protected retirement investors not
by transforming their securities-broker advisers into vigorous
fiduciaries but, instead, by making securities regulation irrelevant to
both retirement investors and advisers. By directing their retirement-
investor customers into passively managed products, advisers will
effectively have opted out of providing fiduciary protection, which is
just as well given that their customers will no longer require it.
Moreover, if retirement investors are better off eschewing active
management and instead seeking to earn the market returns that
passive management provides, then none of that matters. These
investors will achieve the best result possible, with the further benefit
that they will no longer need to pay for advice, whether through
transaction-based fees, asset-based fees, or otherwise.
2. Exclusionary Implications
In fact, however, retirement investors will arguably be worse off
as a result of the transformation of their interaction with the securities
markets that the fiduciary rule sets in motion.147 To begin with, it is
far from certain whether passively managed products are the most
146. See Timothy W. Martin, What Does Nevada's $35 Billion Fund Manager Do All
Day? Nothing, WALL ST. J.: A-HED (Oct. 19, 2016, 11:13 AM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/what-does-nevadas-35-billion-fund-manager-do-all-day-nothing-1476887420 (noting
that the "daily trading strategy" of the manager of Nevada's public employee pension fund is
to "[d]o as little as possible, usually nothing").
147. See Michael Fritts, 4 Ways the Fiduciary Rule Could Hurt (Not Help) Investors,
KIPLINGER (July 2017), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/T023-CO32-S014-
fiduciary-rule-could-end-up-hurting-investors.html.
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suitable investments for most investors under most circumstances.
Despite the lessons of the ECMT, even retail investors are able to
potentially beat the market if, as investors often do, they place their
money under the management of professional asset managers, such as
those that operate mutual funds pursuing actively managed strategies.
Although fund managers' efforts to beat the market may be a zero
sum game, 148 these professionals are typically at least in a position to
be on the winning side of that game more often than not. 149 In
addition, as financial advisers have long counseled, active
management allows investors to diversify their portfolios across
markets and asset classes, helping to protect investors from
catastrophic losses during market dislocations that cause all holdings
within a particular market or index to lose substantial value.150
But more is at stake for retirement investors in the market-wide
shift to passive management than their ability to invest prudently. In
particular, regardless of the extent to which active management is
good for investors' portfolios, the broadscale move from active to
passive management-and the regulatory changes driving it-defeat
securities regulatory objectives. One of those objectives, recall, is
protecting investors. Although investor protection is typically
associated with the narrow goals of ensuring that investors have
access to information regarding possible investments and punishing
148. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (describing how some actively
managed portfolios achieve above-market returns at the expense of other actively managed
portfolios).
149. See Timothy Armour, You Don't Have To Settle for Average Investing Returns.
Here's Why, WALL ST. J.: MKTS. (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/you-dont-
have-to-settle-for-average-investing-returns-heres-why-1476717440 ("Research by Capital
Group shows that a group of active funds with low expenses and a substantial amount of the
manager's own money invested in the funds on average beat their benchmarks 89% of the
time over 10-year rolling periods."). Some managers using actively managed strategies are
successful in doing so because they are able to identify particular securities or sectors are
over- or undervalued and to position the funds they manage to take advantage of those
insights-for example, to hold short positions in overvalued securities. See Michael
Roberge, Active vs. Passive? Choose Both, WALL ST. J.: MKTS. (Oct. 17, 2016, 11:14 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/active-vs-passive-choose-both-1476717262 (noting that although
"average active manager[s]" may be unable to "beat their benchmark, net of fees" on a
consistent basis, "there are skilled active managers who have consistently outperformed their
benchmarks over a full market cycle").
150. See Roberge, supra note 149 (observing that "[a]llocating assets to active and
passive strategies should be viewed similarly" to "diversify[ing] between stocks and bonds"
and that "[i]n periods of higher market volatility ... active stock picking and strong risk
management could ... help buoy overall portfolio performance").
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those who would defraud them,151 it is closely aligned with a broader
goal-namely, deepening investors' involvement in the securities
markets by increasing the range of investment opportunities available
to them.152 The processes that the fiduciary rule catalyzes, discussed
above, turn this arguably loftier objective on its head because, instead
of increasing investment opportunities for investors, they effectively
remove most investors-most retirement investors, at least-from the
securities markets altogether.
Of course, investing passively is nevertheless investing and
necessarily involves the securities markets to that extent. However, it
is not the type of participation that Congress envisioned in
formulating the securities laws, whereby each investor's activities in
the securities markets are determined by her particular needs and
objectives and dependent upon the assistance of a qualified adviser,
whether in the form of a registered investment adviser or in the form
of a securities broker.153 Nor is it the type of participation that has
long been-and will continue to be-a given for investors who
qualify as sophisticated, who have sufficient assets to engage
registered investment advisers to manage their accounts and to invest
in privately offered products, including hedge funds and private equity
funds.154
Indeed, this is perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the
investment trend that the fiduciary rule has forcefully bolstered: not
only does investor protection in this emergent context not
countenance increasing opportunities for most retirement investors, it
151. See Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad
Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 43 (2011) ("Congress'
principal intent in enacting the securities laws was investor protection (primarily through
mandatory disclosure coupled with anti-fraud rules). . . .").
152. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?-
Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital
Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 987, 1027 (1992) ("Regulators must be mindful of the
importance of enhancing efficiency by providing for various modes of market participation
while simultaneously keeping in mind the goal of individual investor protection."); Michael
J. Schmidt, "Investor Protection" in Europe and the United States: Impacting the Future of
Hedge Funds, 25 Wis. IT'L L.J. 161, 165 (2007) ("As a basic regulatory purpose, investor
protections are necessary to effectively ... encourage market participation.").
153. See supra notes 135-140 and accompanying text (discussing how, as Congress
envisioned it, investment advice is inherently personal to the person to whom it is provided
and should be tailored accordingly).
154. See Jason Zweig, Do You See Yourself as a Sophisticated Investor?, WALL ST. J.:
MONEYBEAT (July 18, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/07/18/do-
you-see-yourself-as-a-sophisticated-investor/ (noting that only "sophisticated" investors may
participate in private fund offerings).
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also widens the gap between those investors and those who already
are advantaged in their investment activities, as well as in many other
aspects of life. That this damage to retirement investors is wrought by
regulation is all the more concerning, given that protecting average-
wealth investors is the SEC's signal role 155 and that protective
regulation is less important for sophisticated investors, who are
deemed capable of fending for themselves.156 Yet, as the DOL would
have it, sophisticated investors will be the only ones remaining to
protect.
Finally, the fiduciary rule's effects extend to capital formation,
another primary objective of securities regulation. Capital formation
is simply the process of increasing the amount of resources that firms
can deploy toward producing more and better goods and services, and
contributing to economic growth.157 Yet, one might ask: In an
investment arena dominated by passive management, how can capital
stock accumulate in an efficient manner when investors no longer
attempt to distinguish among the firms that compose global
economies? Indeed, not only is active management-that is,
investment based on new information about companies and sectors
that lowers the prices of overvalued securities and increases the prices
of undervalued ones-necessary for furthering the capital formation
process, it is also a prerequisite for passive management, which is
based on the premise that markets are efficient.158
155. See Brian G. Cartwright, Whither the SEC Now?, 95 VA. L. REv. 1085, 1103
(2009) ("The SEC's core competence is protection of the retail investor.").
156. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99
CORNELL L. REv. 1, 27 (2013) ("In broad terms, the securities regulations deem wealthy or
sophisticated investors able to fend for themselves but less wealthy or less sophisticated
investors as unable to do so.").
157. See Capital Formation, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
capital-formation.asp (last visited Aug. 29, 2017) ("Capital formation is a term used to
describe the net capital accumulation during an accounting period for a particular country,
and the term refers to additions of capital stock, such as equipment, tools, transportation
assets and electricity.").
158. See Larry Hatheway, Remember the Debt Passive Funds Owe Active Managers,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/6f3ddf5O-5a54-11e6-8d05-4eaa662
92c32 (observing that "market efficiency ... requires active management to ensure that any
inefficiency is bid away" and that "[p]ure passive investing can ... be seen as leveraging the
work of active managers whose efforts are required to maintain market efficiency");
Tergesen & Zweig, supra note 106 ("[I]f fewer managers are drilling into financial reports to
pick the best stocks and avoid the worst-index funds buy stocks blindly-that could
eventually undermine the market's capacity to price shares efficiently.").
2017] 375
TULANE LAW REVIEW
IV. EVALUATING AND ADVANCING POLICYMAKING
The DOL has adopted a rule that is within its regulatory mandate
but also deep within the SEC's usual regulatory terrain. It did so,
moreover, to the detriment of retirement investors, as the previous Part
details. Not only does the rule incentivize advisers to funnel
retirement investors into passively managed products, it also reflects
an exclusionary sentiment that would diminish, rather than increase,
these investors' participation in the securities markets. Nevertheless,
that the DOL shares considerable, and largely unquestioned, authority
with the SEC is not, on its own, problematic-raising the question of
why it is problematic in this case.
This Part addresses that question, identifying the causes of the
rule's deficiencies and proposing generalizable lessons that can guide
future policymaking. Part IVA uses a doctrinal lens to discern the
ways in which the fiduciary rule is inconsistent with the structure of
the U.S. securities regulatory regime and to identify the origins of the
rule's shortcomings. Addressing the "cause" question from a broader
perspective, Part IVB discusses what the DOIs recent rulemaking
tells us about the regulatory silos that dominate U.S. financial
regulation-and about achieving effective and efficient regulation
even in the context of shared regulatory authority. Finally, this Part
suggests how strengthening nonfiduciary advisers' obligations to their
employee benefit plan and IRA customers might be accomplished in
a less destructive way.
A. The Foundations of US. Securities Law
This subpart first contends that, in the system of laws and rules
that constitutes U.S. securities regulation, the fiduciary rule is
inconsistent with the core foundational principle of the U.S. system of
securities regulation-neutrality--and therefore causes dysfunction in
that system. Pointing to a second deficiency, the subpart argues that
the fiduciary rule also disregards securities regulation's core
challenge, which is to manage the harm wrought by conflicts of
interest without eliminating conflicts altogether.
1. Maintaining Neutrality
Neutrality-regarding securities, issuers, and risks associated
with investing-is the foundation of U.S. securities regulation and the
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pivot around which most of its discrete laws and rules revolve.159
Indeed, neutrality's primacy is rarely questioned, even as the securities
laws' specific tools for achieving neutrality frequently are. With the
fiduciary rule, however, the DOL has lobbed an alien object into this
neutrality based structure, one that replaces the established concept of
neutrality about investments with a particular notion of what those
investments should be, at least insofar as retirement investors are
concemed.160 That it does so is the basis of the rule's failings.
To appreciate how this is so, consider that over time and in
different jurisdictions, securities regulation has assumed different
forms. Prior to the enactment of the federal securities laws in the
1930s, securities regulation was the province of the states. 161 Most
state securities statutes were predicated on the notion that regulators'
role was to evaluate the merits of each proposed offering, giving the
green light only to those that passed muster. 162 In that context,
"passing muster" typically required that the offering price be adjudged
"fair" and that other aspects of the offered securities be 'just" and
"equitable."6 3
159. See Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly into the
Twenty-First Century, 21 J. CORP. L. 417, 441 (1996) ("From the very beginning, the
securities laws were designed as neutral devices to compel disclosure, avoiding direct
interference in the market's judgment about stock value.").
160. See Greg lacurci, DOL Fiduciary Rule Pushing Broker-Dealer Assets to Fee-
Based Accounts, Away From Commissions, INVESTMENTNEWS: FIDUCIARY Focus (May 24,
2017, 2:43 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170524/FREE/170529958/dol-
fiduciary-rule-pushing-broker-dealer-assets-to-fee-based.
161. See Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1993,
2025 n.181 (1995) ("By 1929, when the stock market crash precipitated the passage of
federal securities laws, all states had some form of securities regulation.").
162. See Ronald J. Colombo, Merit Regulation Via the Suitability Rules, 12 J. INT'L
Bus. & L. 1, 6 (2013) ("'Merit regulation' is what generally characterized the state regulation
of securities at the time of the federal securities laws' promulgation."); Susanna Kim Ripken,
The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive
Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 139, 200 n.238 (2006) ("Merit
regulation refers to state regulation that authorizes state securities administrators to approve
or deny the offering of securities based on their quality, i.e., whether the offering is fair, just,
and equitable.").
163. See Stephen Bainbridge, Federal Merit Review of Securities Offerings? No
Thanks!, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2012/04/federal-merit-review-of-securities-offerings-no-thanks.htm
(quoting Wendy Gerwick Couture, Price Fraud, 63 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 74 (2011))
(discussing the difficulties associated with merit regulation). At the other end of the
spectrum, some regulatory bodies have adopted a hands-off approach, whereby any offering
not involving fraud was permissible. See id. (describing the "fraud model" of securities
regulation).
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Congress nonetheless took a different approach in its
policymaking after the Great Depression, crafting a regulatory
structure that obviates the judgment calls that merit regulation
requires. 164 More specifically, Congress determined that those
standing in certain roles vis-a-vis securities transactions (issuers and
securities brokers, most notably) must share with their counterparties
(investors, typically) relevant information about the securities being
bought or sold.165 The notion was that, armed with such information,
investors should be able to make decisions involving the issuer or its
securities with open eyes.1 66 And because disclosed information must
be truthful and not otherwise misleading in order to be effective,
Congress coupled the securities laws' robust disclosure requirements
with commensurately robust prohibitions on fraud.167
Congress's preferred route allowed it to avoid the difficulties
associated with a merit-focused approach to securities regulation-the
dominant one being that merit regulation is paternalistic, predicated
on the notion that investors are unable to determine which investments
further their interests and which do not.168 Merit regulation, in other
words, assumes that investors will get it wrong and that regulators will
get it right. Yet regulation may, in fact, not get it right because, in
terms of the substance of what securities issuers do-what services
they provide or what goods they produce-regulators have no more
insight or understanding than entrepreneurs, economists, customers,
or investors.169 A related problem is that by implicitly requiring that
164. See Colombo, supra note 162, at 6 ("[W]hen the United States enacted a regime
of federal securities regulation, the road not taken was that of merit regulation.").
165. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Tallant, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 95,779, at 90,820 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (observing that "equalization of bargaining
positions" is "[a] common thread running through the fabric of the various securities cases");
Anita K. Krug, Investing and Pretending, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1559, 1608 (2015) ("[S]ecurities
regulation ... focuses on those with the relative knowledge and, therefore, the relative power
[and] seeks to ensure that those with whom those persons transact either have power in their
own right. . . or are given access to all relevant information.").
166. See What We Do, supra note 43 (explaining that disclosures provide "information
about the companies' financial condition and business practices to help investors make
informed investment decisions").
167. See Michael D. Guttentag, Protection From What? Investor Protection and the
JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAvIs Bus. L.J. 207, 209 (2013) ("Mandatory disclosure requirements, in
conjunction with antifraud liability, are the primary means by which federal securities
regulations are supposed to protect investors.").
168. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Dissecting the Two-Handed Lawyer: Thinking Versus
Action in Business Lawyering, 10 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 231, 247 (2013) (observing that merit
regulation is "objectionable for [its] paternalism").
169. See Gerwick Couture, supra note 163, at 76 ("[M]erit review is often criticized
for interposing an ill-equipped middleman between issuers and investors.").
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offerings fit regulators' notions of fairness, merit regulation impedes
issuers' financing efforts, including by dissuading them from
proceeding with their offerings, thereby harming capital formation on
a market-wide basis.170
The fiduciary rule is a form of merit regulation. Although the
rule does not require regulatory approval of a securities transaction
based on regulators' evaluation of its merits as in the classic
understanding of merit regulation, it achieves the same results by
virtue of the incentives that it creates-it incentivizes advisers to
recommend certain investment products over others and effectively to
opt out of securities regulation-and, in the process, pushes investors
out of the securities markets.171 However, drawing on the criticisms of
merit regulation, the DOL has no more insight than do most
retirement investors regarding what types of investments and
investment strategies are in those investors' best interests, as Part El
suggests. Moreover, it is conceivable that the fiduciary rule's implicit
bias could make capital formation less efficient, such as by
influencing the nature and extent of the services that advisers provide.
From another, more structural perspective, the rule's infusion of
regulatory bias in an environment that otherwise emphasizes
neutrality does not work because the bias is limited. That is, in
endorsing a particular investment strategy, the DOL did not address
how retirement investors should participate in domains outside of its
purview-outside of the context of investing retirement assets-in
order to counteract the harmful effects of that endorsement. Perhaps
(nonretirement) investment opportunities should be expanded for
retirement investors, or perhaps all investors should be encouraged to
invest some portion of their assets in actively managed products. The
DOL did not complete the picture-and, of course, could not
complete the picture, given that its mandate does not extend past
protecting market participants in their capacities as retirement
investors.
170. See id. at 77 ("[M]erit review is often maligned for preventing issuers from
raising capital by denying them registration."). A less-pronounced concem with merit
regulation is that it produces the prospect of corruption in the regulatory approval process: If
regulators have a gatekeeper role in securities offerings, they are also well-positioned to
extract rents from would-be issuers. See Robin Hui Huang, The Regulation of Securities
Offerings in China: Reconsidering the Merit Review Element in Light of the Global
Financial Crisis, 41 HONG KONG L.J. 261, 270 (2011) ("[M]erit regulation has ... provided a
fertile breeding ground for rent seeking and corruption by regulators.").
171. See supra notes 151-156 and accompanying text.
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2. Muting Conflicts of Interest
We might say that the fiduciary rule causes harm not only
because it harbors the deficiencies typically associated with merit
regulation but also because the very fact of its inconsistency with
neutrality, as the foundational principle of securities regulation, leaves
a gap in the securities regulatory framework. Yet there is a second
difficulty: The rulemaking is also inconsistent with the way that
securities regulation addresses its core challenge, which is to
minimize the harm caused by the conflicts of interest that characterize
the activities of many securities market participants.172
As securities regulation recognizes, those with an advantage in
the securities markets are necessarily conflicted, in that they have
incentives to use that advantage to further their own financial interests
rather than those of their customers, clients, or investors.173 For
example, a securities issuer has an incentive to "hype" its offerings
and performance outlook because doing so will attract investors and
possibly increase the price at which it is able to sell its securities. 174 A
registered investment adviser has an incentive to "front-run" her
clients, such as by buying particular securities and then
recommending those same securities to her clients, because doing so
will increase the market price of the recommended securities, thereby
172. See, e.g., Jennifer O'Hare, Synthetic CDOs, Conflicts of Interest, and Securities
Fraud, 48 U. RICH. L. REv. 667, 729 n.413 (2014) ("[The federal securities laws .. . permit
conflicts of interest to be managed through disclosure in some circumstances."); Symposium,
The Regulation ofInvestment Funds, 16 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 1, 11 (2011) (observing
that investment advisers' compliance officers "serve as the front-line watch for violations of
securities laws and provide protection against conflicts of interest") (comments of Andrew J.
Donohue); Peter Talosig M, Regulation FD-Fairly Disruptive? An Increase in Capital
Market Inefficiency, 9 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FiN. L. 637, 643-44 (2004) (observing that a
policy concern behind the SEC's adoption of Regulation FD was "to minimize conflicts of
interests among analysts and the issuers which might seek to curry favor with analysts in
return for favorable coverage").
173. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) ("A
fundamental purpose [of the securities laws] was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in
the securities industry."); Karmel, supra note 31, at 435 ("Conflicts of interest are common in
every fiduciary relationship in the financial services industry.").
174. See BancBoston Robertson Stephens Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed
Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Apr. 7,
1999), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73098/benningtl.htm (observing that "[a]n
issuer's shares may be high priced and actively traded for a variety of reasons" including
"false rumors, fraud, arbitrage, ill-informed hype by commentators, etc." and that "dollar
thresholds significantly favor stocks with a high hype level").
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also increasing the adviser's own investment profits.175 A mutual fund
manager has an incentive to cause the fund it manages to pay third
parties for marketing services because doing so will increase the
fund's assets and, along with them, the amount of (asset-based) fees
that the manager receives from the fund.176
Of course, other legal fields, as well, focus on muting conflicts
of interest. After all, to the extent that actors in a regulated area do not
behave as they should, it is usually because there is an alternative
behavior that they believe better serves their interests. Regulation-
and its threat of punishment for those who do not comply-addresses
these conflicts by causing it to be in actors' interests to conduct
themselves as regulation prescribes.177 However, conflicts in the
securities markets have a different character than they do in other
(nonfinancial) domains, due to the fact that in the financial realm,
unlike others, any particular conflict is almost immediately reducible
to money. Money, in turn, is a more potent motivator than any other
source of conflicts, as both financial catastrophes and academic
analyses have suggested.178
Securities regulation further recognizes that the securities
markets, like other financial markets, would not (and could not) exist
without conflicts. For example, regulation cannot simply prohibit
issuers from selling their securities to investors because selling equity
175. See Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 181-83, 200-01 (holding
that an investment adviser that published a newsletter containing investment
recommendations acted inappropriately in recommending various securities to subscribers
after having purchased those securities for the adviser's own account, thereby increasing its
profit, without disclosing the practice to subscribers).
176. See Siemers v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2007 WL 760750, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007) (describing how a mutual fund's payment of marketing expenses
and the fund's associated growth "inures primarily, if not exclusively, to the benefit of the
sponsor and its stake in ever-larger management and advisory fees").
177. See Sarah L. Stafford, Outsourcing Enforcement: Principles To Guide Self-
Policing Regimes, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 2293, 2306 (2011) ("[P]otential violators will ... be
deterred by the threat of punishment if the decision to violate is based on rational comparison
of the cost of compliance compared to the expected cost of violation.").
178. See George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion
Problem, 100 VA. L. REv. 261, 308 (2014) ("[A]s is so often the case, one of the best
motivators may be money."); Stacy Goto Grant, International Financial Regulation Through
the G20: The Proprietary Trading Case Study, 45 GEo. J. INT'L L. 1217, 1221-22 (2014)
(describing how certain "conflicts of interest are supposed to be restricted by fiduciary
relationships, but the desire to make money for the firm's own account creates perverse
incentives to violate any fiduciary duties"); Chip Pitts, Pro-Social Corporate Value(s),
Culture, and Purpose Before Profit, in Logic and Law, 16 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 69, 86 (2015)
("In general, we place far too much emphasis on extrinsic motivators like money as opposed
to intrinsic motivators like values, meaning, pride, and the sense of doing something
worthwhile that's bigger than ourselves.").
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is an effective way for businesses to obtain financing to grow their
operations, and it fosters economic growth. 179 Similarly, regulation
cannot prohibit registered investment advisers from buying for their
own accounts the securities they recommend to clients because it is
desirable (for both investors and the securities markets) for financial
professionals to have "skin in the game"-that is, to be subject to the
same risks as those to which their clients are subject.1o Nor, then, can
regulation simply prohibit mutual funds from engaging marketers to
sell their securities because the additional capital that successful
marketing produces, by creating a larger pie, lowers the fees and other
costs borne by all of the funds' investors and therefore also promotes
more efficient capital markets.181
These observations mean that, in the financial realm, a different
approach to addressing conflicts is warranted. Accordingly, to address
the risks that conflicts create, the securities laws and the SEC employ
a balancing approach, whereby those who have the advantage in
various types of securities transactions may proceed with their
activities, subject to defined limits. Issuers may conduct securities
offerings but, in so doing, must adhere to stringent limitations on
advertising and truthfully disclose material facts about themselves and
the offered securities.182 Registered investment advisers may buy
securities that they also recommend to clients but, in so doing, must
179. See Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer's Guide to
Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REv. 773, 817 (2004) ("Sometimes favorable
financing can be obtained through borrowing, although generally selling equity in a company
may be the only method available to finance a start-up business."); Mark Rambler, Instead of
Borrowing, Should My Business Sell Equity?, CREDIBILYTY CAP. (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.
credibilitycapital.com/news/2016/7/19/instead-of-borrowing-should-my-business-sell-equity-
instead (observing that "[fjor businesses that can effectively attract equity investors, selling
equity to fund growth is a good option" because debt can be "can be a major drain on a
business").
180. See Paul Katzeff, Does Your Mutual Fund Manager Have Skin in the Game?
These Do, INv. Bus. DAILY: MUTUAL FUNDs (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.investors.com/etfs-
and-funds/mutual-funds/does-your-mutual-fund-manager-have-skin-in-the-game-these-do/
(contending that "[h]aving skin in the game matters" and that "[flunds with at least one
manager who has a lot of their own money invested in the fund are more likely to outperform
than funds whose managers have little or none of their cash on the line").
181. See What Drives Your Fund Costs Up or Down?, VANGUARD (June 15, 2016),
https://investomews.vanguard/what-drives-your-fund-costs-up-or-down/ ("When [fund]
assets grow (whether from market appreciation or cash flow), a fund achieves economies of
scale: Fixed costs spread over the larger asset base represent a smaller share of assets.").
182. See A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting "Truth in Securities" Revisited: Abolishing IPOs
and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 999, 1003
(2013) ("[P]ublic offerings are subject not only to extensive disclosure requirements, but also
to a byzantine array of gun-jumping rules limiting voluntary disclosure intended to curb
speculative frenzies for newly issued securities.").
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make certain that clients are not thereby disadvantaged.1 83 Mutual
funds may pay marketers to sell their securities but, in so doing, must
ensure that the amounts paid do not exceed specified thresholds.184
Congress used this approach in its postfinancial crisis
legislation-the Dodd-Frank Act-in instructing the SEC to evaluate
whether securities brokers who provide investment advice should be
subject to fiduciary duties and whether the standards and other rules
then applicable to securities brokers were adequate. Specifically,
Congress directed the agency, in conducting this evaluation, to
consider, among other things, how a heightened standard of conduct
might impact retail investors' access to the products and services that
securities brokers offer.185 Further, it cautioned that, under any rules
the SEC might adopt to implement such a standard, neither brokers'
receipt of transaction-based compensation nor their "sale of only
proprietary or other limited range of products" could be deemed to
violate the standard.186 Congress thus sought to balance the need to
temper problematic conduct by brokers with the need to preserve
brokers' ability to provide their services.
In short, securities regulation perceives that because activities
that produce conflicts are desirable for reasons unrelated to the
conflicts, regulation cannot simply dissolve the conflicts by
prohibiting the associated activities. However, that is what ERISA
and the DOL, as its interpreter and enforcer, seek to do. Rather than
recognize the nature of conflicts-and their inevitability-in the
securities markets, ERISA assumes that it can eliminate them
completely, as the statute's prohibited transaction provisions
183. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 201 (1963) ("The
high standards of business morality exacted by our laws regulating the securities industry do
not permit an investment adviser to trade on the market effect of his own recommendations
without fully and fairly revealing his personal interests in these recommendations to his
clients.").
184. See James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A
Behavioral Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 926 (2005) ("[O]ne percent is the maximum
level of distribution costs that Rule 12b-1 permits to be levied against the fund's assets
.. ); Dana M. Muir, Revenue Sharing in 401(K) Plans: Employers as Monitors?, 20
CoNN. INs. L.J. 485, 490 (2014) ("In 1980, the [SEC] promulgated Rule 12b-1, which
formalized the ability of mutual funds to use fund assets to pay for marketing and distribution
costs.").
185. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(c)(9), 124 Stat. 1376, 1826 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 12, 15 U.S.C.).
186. Id. § 913(k)(2), 124 Stat. at 1828.
2017] 383
TULANE LAWREVIEW
evidence. 187 Indeed, the fallacy of this assumption is arguably the
basis of the DOL's principal role-namely, adopting exemptions that
permit securities professionals to continue to carry out their business
activities vis-di-vis retirement assets, notwithstanding the transaction
prohibitions under ERISA that would otherwise limit their ability to
do so.188
Yet despite the DOL's historical industriousness in softening
ERISA's onerous structures, the agency, in adopting the fiduciary rule,
likewise supposed (in error) that it could, and should, eliminate the
conflicts to which many advisers are subject without also eliminating
these advisers' productive role in counseling retirement investors. By
contrast, the SEC, which has also considered strengthening the
standard of conduct applicable to brokers in connection with their
advisory activities, 189 has at no point countenanced adopting a
standard that would ultimately defeat its own purpose.
B. Regulation in an Era ofShared Authority
The preceding subpart identifies the doctrinal sources of the
fiduciary rule's deficiencies, but there remains another cause, which is
this: a rule that will surely have as substantial an effect on the
securities markets as any rule adopted in the last few decades was the
handiwork not of the SEC but of another regulator, one whose
primary function is only marginally related to the securities markets
and its participants. These special circumstances warrant searching
for the takeaways-that is, lessons that can both guide future
policymaking and augment our understanding of the dangers and
benefits of shared regulatory authority.
The SEC's sharing of regulatory jurisdiction with another
regulator is not unique for regulation generally or for the SEC.
Indeed, scholars have devoted considerable energy to cataloging and
evaluating the widespread phenomenon of shared-or dual or
overlapping-regulatory authority.190 While some observers contend
187. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA's prohibited
transaction provisions).
188. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (describing the DOL's role in
exempting certain types of transactions from ERISA's prohibited transaction provisions).
189. See SEC Releases Staff Study Recommending a Uniform Fiduciary Standard of
Conduct for Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, U. S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Jan. 22, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-20.htm.
190. See, e.g., Aagaard, supra note 38; Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38
CoNN. L. REv. 863, 927 (2006); Elizabeth K. Brill, Privacy and Financial Institutions:
Current Developments Concerning the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 21 ANN. REV.
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that shared authority promotes regulatory efficiency, many others
argue that it does the opposite. Perhaps the primary criticisms in this
regard are that dual regulation of a particular subject often produces
duplicative bodies of rules that are often inconsistent with one another
and that the rules, collectively, are confusing, unduly burdensome, and
inefficient. 191
Unsurprisingly, these criticisms are also the ones directed at
shared regulatory authority in the financial arena, which is extensive.
In addition to the DOL, the SEC's regulatory mandate overlaps with
those of state securities regulators and, at the federal level, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board, the National Futures Association, and
FINRA, among other regulatory authorities. 192 Meanwhile, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
and many other financial regulatory agencies and bodies likewise
share numerous regulatory mandates.193
In this siloed regulatory universe and in associated discussions
about its ailments, however, another obstacle to effective regulation
has generally gone unnoticed: discordant regulatory norms and
objectives. In most circumstances, regulators that share authority over
a particular subject matter have consonant regulatory goals or
priorities. For example, both the Department of Education and the
Department of Housing and Human Services have authority to
regulate how student health information is used.1 94 Although their
BANKING L. 167, 207-08 (2002); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, On Regulatory Discord and
Procedure, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 819, 819-20 (2015); Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps,
Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically
Modified Plants and Animals, 45 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2230-31 (2004); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Agency Coordination in Consumer Protection, 2013 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 329, 330,
356 (2013); Loren Remsberg, Essay, Too Many Cooks in the Galley: Overlapping Agency
Jurisdiction ofBallast Water Regulation, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1412, 1428 (2008).
191. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-32, FINANCIAL REGULATION:
INDUSTRY TRENDS CONTINUE To CHALLENGE THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 1
(2007) (noting in the context of financial regulation that "concerns about inefficient overlaps
in responsibility, undue regulatory burden, and possible gaps in oversight raise questions
about whether the current structure is best suited to meet the nation's needs").
192. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-175, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: COMPLEX AND FRAGMENTED STRUCTURE COULD BE STREAMLINED To IMPROVE
EFFEcTIvENEss 12 (2016) [hereinafter GAO, FRAGMENTED STRUCTURE] (graphically
depicting the overlapping authority of U.S. financial regulators).
193. See id.
194. See Bryan Thurmond, Recent Development, Dismantling a Dual-Headed System
of Governance: How a Regulatory Overlap Undercuts the Security of Student Health
Information in Public Schools, 64 ADMIN. L. REv. 701, 702-03 (2012) (noting that "[tiwo
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approaches to doing so have not always been consistent, the agencies
nevertheless share an overarching objective in the student health
context, which is to protect students' privacy.195 On the other hand,
the objectives of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) in regulating the production
of genetically modified plants are different, as the FDA focuses on
protecting humans by ensuring food safety, 196 while the USDA
focuses on safeguarding and promoting a specific U.S. industry.197
However, the dual regulatory structure arguably has worked in many
contexts in part because the ability of the USDA to further its
objectives depends on the FDA's success with its own mission and
vice versa. 198 And, returning to the financial context, the CFTC
shares authority with the SEC to regulate trading in derivatives and
has often employed approaches that differ from the SEC's, even for
the same types of instruments.1 99 Yet, consistent with the SEC's
objectives, the CFTC aims not only to "protect market users and their
funds" but also to "foster . . . financially sound markets" 200-and
historically has done so through mechanisms, such as disclosure
separate statutes ... govern the privacy of student health information" and that one statute is
administered by the Department of Education, while the other is administered by the
Department of Health and Human Services).
195. See id. at 707-11 (discussing how both strands of regulation aim to ensure the
protection and security of student health information).
196. See What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/ (last updated Apr. 4, 2017) ("The [FDA] is responsible for protecting the public
health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security of ... drugs, biological products, and
medical devices; and by ensuring the safety of our nation's food supply, cosmetics, and
products that emit radiation.").
197. See About the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. DEP'T AGRIc., http://www.
usda.gov/our-agency/about-usda (last visited Aug. 31, 2017) ("[The USDA] ha[s] a vision to
provide economic opportunity through innovation, helping rural America to thrive; to
promote agriculture production that better nourishes Americans while also helping feed
others throughout the world; and to preserve our Nation's natural resources through
conservation, restored forests, improved watersheds, and healthy private working lands.").
198. See Question: What Is More Scrambled than an Egg? Answer: The Federal
Food Inspection System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Fed. Workforce & Agency
Org. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. 38, 51 (2005) (statement of Robert E.
Brackett, Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, USDA) (describing
"examples of collaboration between FDA and USDA on inspections, enforcement, and
training" and noting that "[a]s a result of this effective collaboration, the Federal food safety
system is working well").
199. See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 712, 124 Stat. 1641 (2010) (granting
both the SEC and the CFTC authority to regulate swaps); U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMM'N & U.S. SEc. & EXCH. COMM'N, A JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND THE
CFTC ON HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION 18, 24-26 (2009).
200. Mission & Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/about/missionresponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2017).
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requirements, that are similar to those on which the SEC primarily
relies.201
In the case of the SEC and the DOL, however, there is a
mismatch, as the previous Part suggests. The securities laws are
based on the principle of neutrality, and its specific rules and
requirements revolve around taming conflicts of interest without
eradicating them. 202 Its objectives-protecting investors and
promoting capital formation-focus both on the individual and on the
broader environment in which she conducts her financial activities.
By contrast, ERISA is founded on the principle of achieving optimal
conduct by those with control over retirement investors' assets, while
its rules and requirements center on requiring specific actions and
completely prohibiting others, including any actions that produce
conflicts of interest. 203 Although the statute aims to protect
investors-or, more accurately, a large category of them-it is not
obviously concerned with strengthening the securities markets
generally or increasing their productivity. With this comparison, the
crux of the matter becomes obvious: the fact that the fiduciary rule
fits well within the latter parameters is the source of its dissonance in
the former.
Yet this mismatch may be unique, a suggestion that the examples
above support, at least anecdotally. And, whether it is the exception
that proves the existence of a more generalizable rule-namely, that
regulatory overlap exists primarily where the relevant regulators share
critical operational characteristics-or a harbinger of similar
regulatory failings in the future as society becomes increasingly
regulated, it constitutes a new entry in the policymaking primer.
Policymakers, in formulating specific regulatory requirements and
prohibitions, must become more attuned to the ways in which their
work product may intersect with other regulatory mandates. If the
regulatory state is already ineffective and counterproductive, as many
would argue, 204 then it is past time to be more careful about how we
201. See NAT'L FUTURES Ass'N, DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS: A GUIDE FOR CPOS AND
CTAS 1 (Apr. 2015), https://www.nfa.futures.org/members/member-resources/files/disclosure
-document-guide.pdf (describing disclosure requirements applicable to commodity pool
operators and commodity trading advisors).
202. See supra Part IVA, The Foundations of U.S. Securities Law.
203. See supra Part II.A, ERISA and the DOL's Rules (generally outlining ERISA's
goals and requirements).
204. See, e.g., GAO, FRAGMENTED STRUCTURE, supra note 192, at ii (observing that
fragmented regulation has "created inefficiencies in regulatory processes, inconsistencies in
how regulators oversee similar types of institutions, and differences in the levels of protection
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build upon it. In the present case, in formulating ERISA, Congress
could have expressly required that any rules the DOL might adopt
pertaining to investment advice or the duties advisers owe to
retirement investors be developed with a view toward congruence
with established securities regulatory norms and objectives. One
hopes, however, that the case at hand will be instructive.
Achieving the DOL's laudable goal in adopting the fiduciary
rule-making the securities markets safer for retirement investors-
does not require the particular tools that the DOL chose. Rather, the
Department could have followed the SEC's usual approach and
interpreted fiduciary duty principles pragmatically. Accordingly,
rather than prohibit advisers' traditional practice of receiving per
transaction compensation, the DOL could have sought to balance
relevant interests-on the one hand, an adviser's interest in
conducting business in a manner that allows her to continue operating
as an adviser and to recommend to customers whatever investment
products she may deem to be in those customers' best interests and,
on the other hand, the customers' interests in receiving the best advice
available at a reasonable price.
The SEC's positions on registered investment advisers' trade
allocation and broker selection procedures provide useful analogies.
First, in buying or selling a security on behalf of its clients, an
investment adviser may preference some clients over others-even
though the transaction is appropriate, in the adviser's judgment, for
each of its clients. Such an approach might be warranted if, for
example, the adviser wishes to buy a security that is limited in
supply.205 Under informal SEC guidance, however, the adviser must
implement a rotation or similar system in which every client is
afforded to consumers"); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 407, 411 (1990) (observing that "regulation has frequently failed" and that it has
"imposed enormously high costs for speculative benefits; sometimes ... accomplished little
or nothing; and sometimes ... aggravated the very problem it was designed to solve").
205. See Shane B. Hansen, Best Execution and Trading Practices: Serving Your
Clients While Preparing for Your Regulators, WARNER NORCROSS & JuDD LLP 12 (Nov. 20,
2013), https://www.wnj.com/WarnerNorcrossJudd/media/files/uploads/Documents/WNJ-
IAA-Workshop-Best-Execution-and-Trading-Practices-(2013-11-19).pdf ("Trade allocation
issues often arise in ... determining which clients will participate in transactions involving
initial public offerings or private placements where the supply is limited .... ).
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advantaged in such a transaction no more or less frequently than any
other client so that the adviser treats all clients fairly over time.206
Second, in selecting a broker to execute a securities trade on
behalf of a client, a registered investment adviser is required to
achieve "best execution" and, in determining what is "best," may
consider a range of factors, including brokers' reliability and financial
stability, the size of the transaction, and the market for the security
being bought or sold.207 Notably, the adviser may also consider
whether a broker has a so-called "soft dollar" arrangement with the
adviser, whereby the broker will provide the adviser with research or
other services or products (beyond the mere execution of securities
transactions) that the adviser may use for her own benefit or for the
benefit of clients other than the ones executing the particular
transaction. 208 Importantly, however, SEC guidance requires that
advisers provide robust disclosure to their clients about the advisers'
broker selection policies and procedures and the nature and extent of
the advisers' soft-dollar activities.209
Applied to a reformed fiduciary rule, these approaches might
require, for example, that an adviser recommend only those products
that she believes to be in the relevant customer's best interests, defined
broadly to include a range of factors. Such factors could include ones
pertaining directly to the product, such as the product's investment
approach, the identity of its manager or sponsor, or its historical
performance. But they could also include the amount of the
(transaction-based) compensation the adviser will receive in
206. See id. ("The adviser's fiduciary obligations have been construed to require, that
over time, the adviser 'fairly and equitably' allocate investment opportunities among its
clients having a similar investment objective.").
207. See Interpretive Release Concerning the Scope of Section 28(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Related Matters, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,004, 16,011 (Apr. 30, 1986)
[hereinafter SEC Interpretive Release] (opining that "[a] money manager should consider the
full range and quality of a broker's services in placing brokerage including, among other
things, the value of research provided as well as execution capability, commission rate,
financial responsibility, and responsiveness to the money manager" and that the
"determinative factor" in this regard "is not the lowest possible commission cost but whether
the transaction represents the best qualitative execution for the managed account").
208. See id. at 16,005 (noting that under section 28(e) of the Exchange Act, "money
managers [may] consider the provision of research, as well as execution services, in
evaluating the cost of brokerage services without violating their fiduciary responsibilities");
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2012) (setting forth a safe harbor for fiduciaries who obtain research
and brokerage services and products using client commissions).
209. See SEC Interpretive Release, supra note 207, at 16,007-08 (observing that
"[d]isclosure is required even if an arrangement is within the safe harbor provided by section
28(e)" and "adopt[ing] mandatory disclosure standards for advisers involved in such
arrangements").
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connection with the transaction, as well as whether that compensation
is consistent with the adviser's ability to remain profitable. A further
requirement, however, might be that the adviser ensure that the
transaction costs that the customer bears, either over time or in
comparison to the costs borne by the adviser's other customers, are
within a range of costs deemed reasonable by the SEC, working with
industry participants.
There are other options for reformulating the fiduciary rule, as
one might expect. The point, however, is that any rulemaking that the
DOL may undertake that might also be labeled "securities
regulation"--and, indeed, any such rulemaking that any other agency
other than the SEC may undertake-should take its cue from the way
that U.S. securities regulation has been "done" since the early 1930s.
This is so not because there is no other or better way to accomplish
securities regulatory objectives (this author has argued on many
occasions that there are, in fact, better ways) but because the DOL's
all-or-nothing approach diminishes the efficacy of the securities
regulatory framework that has developed over the past eighty-four
years and the relevance of the goals that that framework exists to
advance. Any particular rule may further regulatory objectives or
may oppose them; however, as this Article suggests, that assessment
cannot be made without a view to the rules that surround it and the
purpose for which they exist.
V. CONCLUSION
Investors face formidable obstacles in investing effectively-that
is, in a manner that furthers their long-term investment objectives. In
this regard, navigating the vagaries and volatilities of the financial
markets presents only one challenge. Other challenges arise from the
process by which investing occurs and the myriad financial
professionals-advisers, brokers, plan sponsors-on which it
depends. Accordingly, the DOI's adoption of the fiduciary rule,
which pushes these professionals to focus exclusively on furthering
investors' best interests, has firm grounding in legitimate needs.
Based on the Department's intentions alone, the rule is difficult to
criticize.
Unfortunately, however, a dissection of the fiduciary rule reveals
that it harbors much to criticize. By adopting the rule, the DOL has
stepped further into the realm of securities regulation than it ever had
previously and has determined-albeit not explicitly-to promote a
particular mode of investing over others. In the process, it has also
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promoted the exclusion of investors from the financial markets in
contravention of securities regulatory objectives and rendered
investment advice-and fiduciary duties themselves-irrelevant.
Ironically, if there remains an important role for active management in
investors' portfolios, then the DOIs requirement that advisers act in
their customers' best interests will have produced the result that
advisers (by recommending passively managed strategies to the
exclusion of actively managed ones) most likely will not act in their
customer's best interests. That is significant on its own.
Perhaps more significant is that these latent, but worrisome,
consequences stem from the DOI's failure to heed the core principle
and challenges of U.S. securities regulation. U.S. securities regulation
is based on the notion that regulation should be neutral as among the
activities that issuers pursue and should harness, without necessarily
abolishing, financial professionals' conflicts of interest. Yet with its
fiduciary rule, the DOL has effectively forsaken that neutrality and
effected a scorched earth strategy against conflicts. We might say,
then, that the essential cause of the fiduciary rule's deficiencies is a
divergence between two regulators' ends and means. Thus arises this
case study's defining lesson: although the factors that produce
effective shared regulatory authority are surely elusive-and certainly
warrant additional analysis-they necessarily consist of more than
admirable intentions and the recognition of unmet needs, however
legitimate those needs may be.
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